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Peter H. Schuckt
It's a damn good thing for Peter Brimelow and his son, Alexander James
Frank Brimelow, that Alexander was born in this country in 1991. Peter, a
recently naturalized Briton, obviously loves the boy and wants him to live in
the United States with Peter and his Canadian wife. But if Alexander had been
born elsewhere, he would not be an American citizen, and if his dad had his
way with our immigration policy, perhaps none of the Brimelows, dad
included, could have entered as immigrants. The Brimelows are fortunate that
the law did not and does not reflect Peter's radically anti-immigration
prescriptions. And so, I shall argue, are the rest of us.
Part of the allure of this high-spirited,' chatty, often personal,2 but
otherwise uncharming book is that the author acknowledges such ironies.
Indeed, he skillfully exploits them to construct a case for radical reform of
immigration policy that verges on total elimination of immigration to the
United States. Thus, he ruefully tells us that he feels "slightly, well, guilty that
[Alexander's] fellow Americans had so little choice" in conferring a citizenship
that Alexander, like many children of illegal aliens and temporary visitors,
acquired through the fortuity of birth on American soil.' He shrugs off the
* Senior Editor, Forbes and National Review.
t Simeon E. Baldwin Professor of Law, Yale Law School. I wish to acknowledge the valuable
comments on an earlier draft by Frank Bean, Boris Bittker, Kevin Johnson, Stephen Legomsky, David
Martin, Dorothy Nelkin, Gerald Neuman, Stephan Themstrom, and the participants in a faculty workshop
at the Washington University School of Law on October 24, 1995.
1. Jack Miles aptly refers to it as "bottled brio." Jack Miles, The Coming Immigration Debate,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1995, at 130, 131 (reviewing PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON
SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION DISASTER (1995) [hereinafter ALIEN NATION]).
2. Too personal, in some respects-a point noted by Jack Miles in his largely admiring review. See
id. at 140.
3. ALIEN NATION, supra note I, at 4. On birthright citizenship, see Hearing Before the Subcomm on
Immigration and Claims and the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
1963
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prospect (now happily hypothetical in his own case) that when Congress
adopts his proposal to cut off legal immigration entirely, even the nuclear
family of an American citizen could not immigrate to the United States. Had
that been the law when he came, he says in his amiable, no-big-deal style, "I
would probably be writing a book on Canadian immigration policy right
now."4
Although it is tempting to dismiss this book as another ideological tract,
one to which only the already-converted will attend, that would be a mistake.
The book must be taken seriously, first, because it is already influencing the
public debate on immigration. Alien Nation has grand ambitions. It not only
raises fundamental questions about immigration's effect on the past, present,
and future of American society (which is common enough in this era of
apocalyptic politics) but also proposes to answer them (which is more
unusual). Brimelow wishes to jettison the basic structure of our immigration
policy established by the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of
1965.7 The 1965 law abolished the national origins quotas, which had been in
effect since 1921,8 replacing them with a system that allocated hemisphere-
specific limits among seven preference categories (based on skills, family
relationships, and refugee status) and in which all countries of origin in the
Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 13, 1995) (statement of Peter H. Schuck, Professor, Yale Law School) [hereinafter
Schuck Testimony]; Letter from Peter H. Schuck, Professor, Yale Law School, & Rogers Smith, Professor,
Yale University, to House Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims and House Subcomm. on the Constitution
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary (Feb. 14, 1996) (supplementing Dec. 1995 testimony) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Supplemental Letter).
4. ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 263.
5. For example, in his review of the book, Aristide Zolberg expresses surprise and dismay as to "[w]hy
this journalistic broadside has received such respectful treatment." Aristide Zolberg, Book Review, 21
POPULATION & DEv. REv. 659, 659 (1995). A number of other readers have been similarly dismissive.
6. The media and Congress have already given it much prominence, and it is bound to receive more
attention as we approach two seismic political events: congressional action on immigration reform
legislation and the 1996 election campaign. For a sampling of Brimelow's appearances on national
television programs, see Booknotes (C-SPAN television broadcast, June 11, 1995), cited in Reuters
Daybook, June 11, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File; Charlie Rose (PBS television
broadcast, Apr. 20, 1995), transcript reprinted in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (transcript no. 1360);
Crossfire (CNN television broadcast, July 4, 1995), available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File
(transcript no. 1398); Firing Line: Resolved: All Immigration Should Be Drastically Reduced (PBS
television broadcast, June 16, 1995), discussed in Walter Goodman, Television Review: An Immigration
Debate's Real Issue, N.Y. TIMEs, June 15, 1995, at C20; MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour: Alien Nation (PBS
television broadcast, Aug. 16, 1995), available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; The McLaughlin
Group (television broadcast, Aug. 1995), discussed in Susan Douglas, Snide Celebrations: Network TV
Political Talk Shows and Women's Rights, PROGRESSIVE, Oct. 1995, at 17, 17. Brimelow has also testified
before Congress. See Immigration Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the
House Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 17, 1995).
7. See ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 258. The 1965 amendments, Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), modified the landmark
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1523 (1988 & Supp. 1994)).
8. See Immigration Act of 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5. Congress adopted the national origins quotas in
provisional form in 1921, id. § 2, 42 Stat. at 5-6, and codified them as a permanent system in 1924,
Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 11, 43 Stat. 153, 159-60.
1964 [Vol. 105: 1963
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eastern hemisphere were subject to the same 20,000-immigrant limit.9 The
immigration reform laws enacted in 1978, 1986, and 1990 preserved the
essential structure (while altering the details) of this system. 0
Brimelow proposes to end this system in favor of "a drastic cutback of
legal immigration."" This proposal is perhaps the only instance of
understatement in a book suffused with hyperbole. Calling his plan a drastic
cutback is rather like calling Jack the Ripper unfriendly. Brimelow would stop
all immigration immediately (but temporarily) and seems to propose a
permanent termination of all family-based, refugee, and asylee immigration.
12
Presumably, he would permit only skills-based immigration, but he does not
indicate how many of these immigrants he would admit. Of all the reform
proposals advanced during this season of discontent, Brimelow's are surely
among the most radical. 3
Another reason to take Alien Nation seriously is its assertion that race
4
ought to matter in immigration policy. In the superheated environment in
which racial issues are debated (and often evaded) today, they continue to be
perhaps the most divisive and incendiary in American society. In the
immigration policy context, they are explosive. Until the 1950s, racism
pervaded and polluted American public law. Until only thirty years ago, it
defined the very structure of our immigration law. Even today, the major
receiving nations, all democracies, have embedded ethnocultural favoritism in
9. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, §§ 1-3, 8, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. at 911-14, 916-17.
10. See Immigration Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, 92 Stat. 907; Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359; Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 4978.
11. ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 262.
12. Id. at 262-63. I say "seems" because he is not altogether clear about how far he is prepared to go
in restricting immigration. Brimelow proposes severe cutbacks in each category that would still preserve
the category in some form, but he also says that, in the end, complete elimination is the preferred policy.
Id. Either Brimelow has not considered the possibility that some of these changes-especially a refusal to
allow genuine asylees to enter the United States-would violate human rights conventions to which the
United States is a signatory, or he does not care if they do.
13. Brimelow, however, is not as radical as Michael Lind, who, to protect the earnings of native-born
Americans, advocates zero net immigration. See MICHAEL LIND, THE NExT AMERICAN NATION: THE NEw
NATIONALISM AND THE FOURTH AMERICAN REVOLUTION 321-22 (1995). I should add that Lind's book
is both provocative and excellent, although its brief discussion of immigration policy is among its weakest
sections.
14. Brimelow's discussion does not distinguish clearly between race, which connotes a close
phenotypic affinity among people, and ethnicity, which connotes a cultural affinity, albeit one in which skin
color might play an important cohesive role. He uses the terms more or less interchangeably. He assumes
that there are well-defined races in the United States today, that they are accurately represented by Census
data, and that they bear race-specific cultural values and behavioral propensities of a kind that would or
should be relevant to immigration policy. These beliefs are as dangerous as they are false. For a critique
of these assumptions, see id. at 118-27.
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their immigration and citizenship policies. 15 In Europe, even more virulent
forms of racism and xenophobia increasingly taint immigration politics.
16
Racism in the United States has declined dramatically in recent decades,
despite frequent denials of this fact. 7 I believe-although the point is
certainly arguable 18 and much turns on difficult definitions-that racism as
such no longer plays a crucial role in immigration law; certainly it plays a less
significant role than it did before 1965. Even so, immigration fundamentally
shapes a number of racially charged policy questions, such as the future level
15. Both the ethnocultural conception of nationhood and the contrasting political conception are traced
in ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY (1992).
16. See generally CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Wayne A. Cornelius et a].
eds., 1994) [hereinafter CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION] (comparing immigration policy and politics of
immigration of Western democracies).
17. For recent reviews and analyses of the evidence, see WILLIAM G. MAYER, THE CHANGING
AMERICAN MIND: HOW AND WHY AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION CHANGED BETwEEN 1960 AND 1988, at
22-28 (1992); BENJAMIN I. PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY YEARS OF
TRENDS IN AMERICA'S POLICY PREFERENCES 68-81 (1992); BYRON M. ROTH, PRESCRIPTION FOR FAILURE:
RACE RELATIONS IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 45-72 (1994). See generally Abigail Thernstrom &
Stephan Thernstrom, The Promise of Racial Equality, in THE NEW PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE 88, 88-101
(Lamar Alexander & Chester E. Finn, Jr. eds., 1995) (discussing indicia of racism and measures of political
and economic progress of African-Americans). Particularly interesting is the increase during the 1980s in
the proportion of whites and blacks who said that they had a "fairly close friend" of the other race. In 1989,
two-thirds of whites reported having a fairly close black friend, up from 50% in 1981. Similarly, 69% of
blacks said that they had a fairly close white friend in 1981; by 1989, this number had increased to 80%.
Id. at 95; see also D'Vera Cohn & Ellen Nakashima, Crossing Racial Lines, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1995,
at Al (discussing newspaper poll that indicates that more than three-quarters of Washington area 12- to
17-year-olds say they have close friend of another race). On the other hand, a recent study finds that at
least one aspect of traditional prejudice-the stereotype of blacks as lazy-is still widespread and
contributes to whites' opposition to welfare. Martin Gilens, Racial Attributes and Opposition to Welfare,
57 J. POL. 994 (1995).
18. The most arguable exceptions, such as the contrast between the immigrant-friendly Cuban
Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ I 101(b)(5),
1255 (1988)), and the often harsh treatment of Haitians, are over-determined; they can also be explained
on geopolitical and ideological grounds. For opposition to the Cuban emigrdes' advantages under the Cuban
Adjustment Act, see The Stick Congress Gave Castro, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1991, at A22 (editorial).
Haitians have experienced a more hostile reception. See Anthony DePalma, For Haitians, Voyage to a Land
of Inequality, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1991, at Al. This differential was much noted-and decried-during
the Haitian refugee crisis that followed the Haitian military's overthrow of the government of President
Jean-Bertrande Aristide in 1991. See, e.g., Bob Herbert, In America: Fasting for Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, May 4,
1994, at A23.
Some observers also attribute much of the support for Proposition 187 in California to racism. See,
e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and California's
Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REV. 629, 650-61
(1995); Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure
of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1451-52 & n.125 (1995). There is room, however,
for genuine disagreement about the significance of the Latino support for the measure. Compare Peter H.
Schuck, The Message of 187, AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1995, at 85, 89-90 (viewing support of significant
minority of Latinos for Proposition 187 as evidence of nonracist nature of support for measure) with
Johnson, supra, at 650-61 (viewing fact that majority of Latinos opposed it as evidence of racism). A
federal district court in California has partially enjoined the enforcement of Proposition 187 on
constitutional grounds. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal.
1995).
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and composition of the population, affirmative action, multicultural education,
and legislative districting.' 9
Indeed, when commentators discuss how immigration affects labor
markets, public budgets, urban development, political strategy, population
growth, and the environment, they frequently refer to statistical data that break
down the empirical effects of immigration, such as welfare utilization or
fertility rates, by race. The public does not need experts to inform it that the
proportion of nonwhites in the population is growing; the "browning" of
America is obvious to anyone who walks down the street, rides a subway, or
visits a classroom in almost any large city.
Nevertheless, the immigration debate has carefully elided discussion of the
normative questions raised by these current and future demographic shifts: Are
these changes good or bad for American society? Should they be slowed,
accelerated, or left undisturbed? Which kinds of arguments support these
evaluations? Our delicate discursive etiquette in matters of race consigns such
questions largely to outspoken nativists such as Patrick Buchanan and to those
who wish to pursue eugenic goals through immigration restriction.20
In more polite, punctilious company, these issues are left to evasive
innuendo-or utter silence. Yet if the immigration debate is to have intellectual
integrity and contribute to sound policy, this void must be filled. We must
somehow learn to discuss racial questions candidly and fearlessly, but also
with respect, sensitivity, and humility. This need is especially compelling in
the immigration policy debate. After all, three decades after the national origins
quotas were repealed, we still select most immigrants according to their
national origins. We do so explicitly in our refugee, "diversity," and nation-
specific (e.g., Cuban) programs, and implicitly in our family-based and
legalization programs.2' And individuals' national origins, of course, are
highly correlated with race.22
Brimelow wishes to advance this debate but doubts that he will receive a
fair hearing. He expects to be labeled a racist, which he archly defines as
"anyone who is winning an argument with a liberal."23 His prediction, if not
19. See infra text accompanying notes 76-93 (racial composition); 180-97 (bilingualism and
multiculturalism); 198-207 (affirmative action); 208-12 (legislative districting).
20. For a recent review of these eugenic arguments, see Dorothy Nelkin & Mark Michaels, Biological
Categories and Border Controls: The Revival of Eugenics in Anti-Immigration Rhetoric (Sept. 12, 1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
21. The national origins of family-based admissions follow those of the petitioning U.S. citizens or
legal resident aliens. For example, the beneficiaries of the massive legalization program, many of whom
may now petition on behalf of their family members, were disproportionately from Mexico and other
Central American nations. See FRANK D. BEAN Er AL., OPENING AND CLOSING THE DOORS: EVALUATING
IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL fig. 5.1 at 69, fig. 5.2 at 71 (1989).
22. Usually, but not always. Almost half of the immigrants from Africa are white. Telephone Interview
with Professor Frank D. Bean, Population Research Center, University of Texas at Austin (Nov. 22, 1995).
23. ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 10-11. He immediately adds, "Or, too often, a libertarian. And,
on the immigration issue, even some confused conservatives." Id. at 11.
1996] 1967
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his definition, is surely correct. Race is very much on his mind.24 But is he
a racist? Since Brimelow himself raises the question of his own racism and
draws the reader's attention to it, a reviewer is tempted to seek an answer. The
issue of his motivation, however, is an unwelcome diversion from the merits
of Brimelow's claims, and I relegate it to a long footnote.2
24. Thus, he is both impressed and obviously dismayed by the fact that "when you enter the INS
waiting rooms you find yourself in an underworld that is not just teeming but is also almost entirely
colored." Id. at 28. He never says why this disturbs him. Similarly, he insists that "[ilt is simply common
sense that Americans have a legitimate interest in their country's racial balance." Id. at 264. Frankly, I do
not understand why that is so, why race per se should matter.
Unfortunately, his racial awareness does not distinguish him from most Americans today; we seem
obsessed with the subject. The difference may be that Brimelow does not simply believe that race does
matter. See, e.g., CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS (1993); see also Peter H. Schuck, Cornell West's Race
Matters: A Dissent, RECONSTRUCTION, 1994 No. 3, at 84 (book review) (praising West's open discussion
of controversial race issues but criticizing specifics of West's analysis). He also believes that it should
matter-a lot.
25. After making his quip about liberals, Brimelow offers a serious definition. Racism, he writes, is
"committing and stubbornly persisting in error about people, regardless of evidence." ALIEN NATION, supra
note I, at 11. He calls this "the only rational definition" of racism. Id. Having noted the question of his
own racism and then defined the term, he immediately dismisses the charge on the ground that he is open
to evidence. This auto-acquittal, however, is not entirely satisfying. For one thing, his definition of racism
as nothing more than an obdurately erroneous methodology of inference is peculiar and evasive. It fails to
distinguish racism from many other more morally acceptable, but still regrettable, forms of cognitive error.
It also ignores the substantive content of racist views, which of course is their chief point of interest. In
common understanding and parlance, racism is a belief in the inherent superiority of one's race, almost
invariably accompanied by feelings of animus or contempt toward members of other races. This definition
would distinguish racism from what Dinesh D'Souza calls "rational discrimination"--discrimination based
not on hostility but on the need to act without full information, which would be costly to acquire, and thus
on the basis of generalizations (or stereotypes) that are certain to be wrong in many, perhaps even most,
individual cases. See DINESH D'SOUzA, THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY
(1995).
In this common-sense understanding of racism, it is hard to say whetherAlien Nation is a racist book.
Brimelow's genial discussion reveals an acute sense of racial pride and difference but little outright animus
or contempt; his breezy, loose-jointed writing style, which makes no pretense of analytical rigor, leaves it
maddeningly unclear precisely what he is claiming. Key concepts such as race and cultural assimilation
remain ill- or undefined. His conclusions about group superiority refer to a group's culture, national origin,
ethnicity, or class rather than to its race or genetic endowment as such. For example, he notes that street
crime is related to "present-orientation," which he says varies among different ethnic groups, and that
"[i]nevitably, therefore, certain ethnic cultures are more crime prone than others." ALIEN NATION, supra
note I, at 184. He then refers to the disproportionate arrest rates among blacks. Id. Nowhere, however, does
he claim that blacks or other disfavored groups are genetically inferior. See id. Specifically, he disavows
any intention to rely on the claims about racial differences in IQ emphasized in RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN
& CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE
(1994), although he is careful not to disavow the claims themselves. See ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at
56 n.*.
On the other hand, the book's central, frequently reiterated claims-that the post-1965 immigrants
are diluting the predominantly white "Anglo-Saxon" Protestant stock that made America great and that this
gravely threatens American society-certainly resemble claims of racial (or at least national origin)
superiority, despite Brimelow's disclaimers. And he seems rather eager to define blacks out of the original
American nation (much as Chief Justice Taney infamously and tragically did in the Dred Scott decision,
see Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)) to support his point that America was essentially
white and European until the despised 1965 law was implemented. See ALIEN NATION, supra note I, at
66-67. For that matter, Brimelow also ignores the presence of substantial numbers of persons of Mexican
descent in the Southwest following the U.S. annexation of the region. Nor does Brimelow's lily-white
vision of pre-1965 America square with the influx of Chinese and Japanese into Califomia and the West
after the Civil War. An interesting contrast is presented by the scrupulously and emphatically nonracist
discussion of many of these same points by Michael Lind. See LIND, supra note 13, at 259-98.
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In the end, the more interesting, significant, and policy-relevant issue is not
the attitudes that underlie Brimelow's claims but the validity of those claims.
If Brimelow's argument that the 1965 Immigration Act has been a national
calamity were correct, we would be extraordinarily myopic and perverse to
ignore or deny that fact-even if his argument were infected by racism. For
reasons that I shall explain in the remainder of this Review, I believe that his
claim is false-or at least premature. But while Alien Nation is a bad book, it
is also a valuable one-all the more so because it is so seductively easy to
read. On the way to its erroneous conclusions, it makes many important points
that are easily overlooked or have been driven underground in current
immigration debates. It forces us to think more clearly about how and why his
arguments are wrong. And it reminds us to resist the patriotic smugness and
national self-delusion that come so easily to Americans and to be vigilant to
assure that Brimelow's dire prophecies are not fulfilled.
The book's argument can be reduced to five distinct but related empirical
claims whose significance can only be understood in the light of certain
normative assumptions about the nature and purposes of American society. The
first is a claim about demography; it asserts that immigration to the United
States has reached unprecedented levels that are problematic in part because
of the racial composition of the post-1965 flow. The second is a claim about
carrying capacity; it holds that these high immigration levels are stretching
American society's environmental resources (broadly defined) beyond the
breaking point. The third is a claim about economic impacts; it contends that
the post-1965 immigrants fail to pull their weight in the labor market and drain
off scarce fiscal resources. The fourth is a claim about cultural assimilation;
it states that the post-1965 immigrants are not embracing American values as
completely or as swiftly as their predecessors did. The fifth is a claim about
politics; it maintains that the post-1965 immigrants are altering the terms of
political discourse in ways that weaken the American polity and call into
question its viability as a nation-state. I shall discuss each of these claims in
turn.
I. DEMOGRAPHY
Brimelow emphasizes that total immigration to the United States, legal and
illegal, is "at historic highs. 26 As Brimelow recognizes, the significance and
truth of this assertion turn on several issues.27 Should immigration be
measured in absolute terms or relative to something else, such as the total or
foreign-born population? Is it more meaningful to measure immigration on an
annual basis or over longer periods of time? How many illegal aliens are being
26. ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 29.
27. See id. at 29-49.
19961 1969
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counted? Should immigration be measured net of permanent departures by
aliens and U.S. citizens, and if so, how many departures are there? Except for
legal admissions, which require the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) to issue visas, none of these indices is based on hard, reliable data; all
can be, and often are, contested.
In absolute terms, legal immigration in 1995, the most recent year for
which statistics are available, was 720,000.28 This represents a decline of ten
percent from the 1994 figure of 804,000, which in turn represented a decline
of eleven percent from the 1993 total of 904,000.29 The 1993-1995 decline
represents the largest two-year drop in legal immigration since the
Depression.3" This decline, moreover, was a broad one, occurring in five
major categories: employment-based admissions, dependents of aliens
previously legalized under the amnesty provisions of the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), family-based admissions, asylees adjusting
to permanent status, and certain special programs (Amerasian children,
Indochinese and Soviet parolees, and registered nurses).31 The 1995 total was
the lowest total since 1988, when 643,000 were admitted.32
These figures might seem to refute Brimelow's "historic highs" claim,
blurring his apocalyptic vision of America being deluged by immigrants.
Before reaching that conclusion, however, we must examine the data more
closely and from different angles. Admissions figures tend to fluctuate from
one year to another, confounding efforts to discern significant trends on the
basis of short-term changes. For example, the admissions total in 1991 was
approximately 1.8 million;33 it then declined over the next four years to
720,000 in 199534 (when the INS had expected the total to increase again35).
These fluctuations often reflect temporary special factors, including the
evolution of particular short-term programs. The most important example is the
legalization program under IRCA. This one-time spike in the admissions totals
produced dramatic increases in the admissions totals beginning in 1989 but
leveling off in 1992. IRCA legalizations, however, have had little effect on the
28. Eric Schmitt, Immigration Bill Advances in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1996, at A16.
29. See IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1994 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE tbl. 1, tbl. B at 20 (1996) [hereinafter
1994 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK].
30. See Schmitt, supra note 28, at A16.
31. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED
STATES IN FISCAL YEAR 1994, at 1-2, tbl. 2 (1995) [hereinafter 1994 IMMIGRATION REPORT].
32. 1994 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 29, tbl.l.
33. Id.
34. The figures for these years include IRCA legalizations, of which there were only 6000 in 1994.
Id. tbl. 4.
35. Telephone Interview with Michael Hoefer, Chief of Demographic Analysis, Immigration and
Naturalization Service (Sept. 20, 1995) [hereinafter Telephone Interview with Hoefer]. The 1994 decline
also reflected the termination of certain special programs and other factors. Id. For what it's worth, the INS
expects legal immigration to increase in 1996. Telephone Interview with Michael Hoefer, Chief of
Demographic Analysis, Immigration and Naturalization Service (Apr. 2, 1996).
[Vol. 105: 19631970
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figures since 1993,36 and, for political reasons, such a legalization is unlikely
to be repeated in the foreseeable future.
Brimelow, then, is right to focus on longer-term trends. He is also correct
to include illegal aliens in the total. Data on the number of illegal aliens are
controversial and inexact, although expert estimates have narrowed
considerably in recent years.37 Estimates are based largely on extrapolations
from the number of aliens apprehended at the Mexican border and from census
surveys. Both methods are problematic. Moreover, the gross category of
illegal aliens must be broken down into subgroups for more precise,
meaningful policy analysis. For example, different policies are needed to deal
with the two, roughly equal, categories of illegal aliens: those who enter the
United States illegally ("entrants without inspection" (EWIs)) and those who
enter legally on temporary visas but then become illegal when they violate the
terms of their visas ("overstays"). As another example, illegal aliens differ in
how long they remain in the United States. Many illegals are temporary
"sojourners," the duration of whose stays in the United States depends on
seasonal, family, and economic factors, or are "commuters" who cross the
border frequently. A growing share of the illegal flow from Mexico, however,
now consists of "settlers"--mostly women and children planning to live with
their families in the United States more or less permanently.39 Because
settlers' prolonged, illegal residence in the United States affects American
society in more complex and significant ways than does the residence of
sojourners, they pose the greatest challenges to politicians and policymakers.
In discussing illegal aliens, Brimelow is somewhat sloppy with the data,
such as they are. Noting both the 1.3 million illegals apprehended by the
Border Patrol in 199340 and estimates that it catches about one-third of those
attempting to cross, he suggests that "a remarkable 2 to 3 million illegal
36. 1994 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 29, at 19. The legalization program is also
contributing to the enormous growth in naturalization petitions that began in 1995, as the program's
beneficiaries are now completing the five-year residency period required for naturalization. See Seth
Mydans, The Latest Big Boom: Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. I1, 1995, at A12. In contrast, the program
for dependent family members of legalized aliens added about 34,000 in 1994, down from 55,000 in 1993.
1994 IMMIGRAION REPORT, supra note 31, tbl. 2. The program will continue to contribute significantly
to the totals for years to come due to the enormous "overhang" of such dependents waiting for visas.
37. See Jeffrey S. Passel, Commentaty: Illegal Migration to the United States-The Demographic
Context, in CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION, supra note 16, at 113, 114-15. Unless otherwise indicated, the
discussion of illegal aliens is based on Frank D. Bean et al., Introduction to UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION
TO THE UNITED STATES: IRCA AND THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 1980s 1, 1-10 (Frank D. Bean et al. eds.,
1990); Thomas J. Espenshade, Unauthorized Immigration to the United States, 21 ANN. REV. SOC. 195
(1995); and Telephone Interview with Hoefer, supra note 35. The other essays in the Bean volume are quite
useful empirical studies of illegal immigration.
38. See Passel, supra note 37, at 114-15.
39. See Wayne A. Cornelius, From Sojourners to Settlers: The Changing Profile of Mexican
Immigration to the United States, in U.S.-MEXICO RELATIONS: LABOR MARKEr INTERDEPENDENCE 155,
155-95 (Jorge A. Bustamante et al. eds., 1992).
40. The number declined to 1.09 million in 1994. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INS FACr BOOK: SUMMARY OF RECENT IMMMIGRATION DATA tbl. 14 (1995).
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immigrants may have succeeded in entering the country in 1993. ' 4I But this
suggestion ignores two well-known phenomena: multiple apprehensions of the
same individuals who make repeated attempts until they cross successfully and
sojourners who travel back and forth across the border repeatedly but are
sometimes apprehended. Both of these common situations inflate the number
of illegals. More important, he cites a "cautious" INS estimate that "300,000
to 500,000" net illegals remain each year.4' His source for this estimate,
however, is an unnamed INS spokesman, and the estimate is higher than the
published estimates-300,000 is the figure most commonly used by researchers
in the field, including INS researchers 43-that he could have readily cited.
A similar slippage occurs when he discusses emigration by U.S. citizens
and permanent residents, which of course bears on the total of net immigration.
The best estimates are that 1.6 million emigrated during the decade of the
1980s, an outflow that has been steadily increasing since the 1940s and
equaled the number emigrating during the 1920s. 4 Emigration seems to be
accelerating during the 1990s.45 He seeks to minimize this factor by stating
that the post-1965 immigrants are less likely to emigrate than their pre-1920
predecessors, a trend that he attributes to the growth of the welfare state.46 He
may be correct, but the data do not establish his claim. First, the emigration
data do not distinguish between noncitizen emigrants who were once
immigrants and emigrants who were U.S. citizens (some of whom were never
immigrants). Second, the decline in emigration began in the 1930s (if measured
in absolute terms) and in the 1940s (if measured as a proportion of
immigration).47 It thus began long before the late 1960s, when Brimelow's
two bates noires-the post-1965 immigration and the major growth in the
welfare state-occurred. This chronology casts some doubt on his welfare-state
explanation for declining emigration rates.
In a sense, however, these are mere details; they do not contradict
Brimelow's position that the current level of net legal immigration is, by
historical standards, quite high in absolute terms. The 1994 net legal
41. ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 33.
42. Id. at 27, 33-34.
43. Robert Warren, Estimates of the Undocumented Immigrant Population Residing in the United
States, by Country of Origin and State of Residence: October 1992, at 13 (Apr. 1995) (unpublished paper
presented at Population Association of America conference, San Francisco, on file with author); Telephone
Interview with Hoefer, supra note 35. A restrictionist group argues for a figure of 400,000 on the basis of
a recent Census Bureau report. See JOHN L. MARTIN, How MANY ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS? I (Center for
Immigration Studies Backgrounder No. 4-95, 1995).
44. Telephone Interview with Hoefer, supra note 35.
45. Ashley Dunn, Skilled Asians Leaving U.S. for High-Tech Jobs at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,
1995, at Al, B5 (reporting that Census Bureau estimates 195,000 foreign-born Americans emigrate each
year, highest since World War I).
46. See ALIEN NATION, supra note I, at 39.
47. See STATISTICS DIV., IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
IMMIGRATION FACT SHEET 4 (1994) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION FACT SHEET] ("Emigration"); Telephone
Interview with Hoefer, supra note 35.
[Vol. 105: 19631972
HeinOnline -- 105 Yale L.J. 1972 1995-1996
Alien Nation
immigration of just over 600,000 (804,000 immigrants minus 195,000
emigrants) is almost three times higher than the annual figures during the
1950s (for Brimelow, the last halcyon period before the Fall), when net legal
immigration averaged just over 209,000.48 It is also almost twice the level
recommended by the politically astute, blue-ribbon Select Commission on
Immigration and Refugee Policy only fifteen years ago.49 Even the figure of
600,000 immigrants understates recent growth, of course, because it fails to
include illegal immigrants, of whom there presumably were relatively few
prior to the mid-1960s and almost none in the early decades of the century:
0
Adding 300,000 resident illegal aliens to the immigrant population each
year5' produces a grand total of at least 900,000 new resident immigrants
each year, net of emigration. This number is high indeed, at least in absolute
terms.
If we consider current immigration in relative, rather than absolute,
terms-that is, new admissions or total foreign-born as a percentage of the
total U.S. population-Brimelow's claim that immigration is at historically
high levels must be qualified somewhat, as he acknowledges." But even
when viewed in these relative terms, the recent inflows have been substantial.
Although the legal immigrants who entered in recent years constituted only
3.1% of the total U.S. population during the 1980s (the comparable shares for
the first three decades of this century were 10.4%, 5.7%, and 3.5%
respectively),53 the steady accumulation of immigrants over time has produced
a growing cohort of foreign-born in the United States. In 1994, over 22 million
people, 8.7% of the total U.S. population, were foreign-born. 54 Although the
48. This figure is obtained by subtracting the INS emigration data from the 1950s, see IMMIGRATION
FACT SHEET, supra note 47, from INS immigration data from that decade, see 1994 INS STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK, supra note 29, tbl. I.
49. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
JUDICIARY & SUBCOMMS. ON IMMIGRATION, REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HOUSE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, FINAL REPORT OFTHE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, 97th
Cong., Ist Sess. 30 (1981) (statement of Rev. Theodore Hesburgh) (recommending cap on legal
immigration of 350,000).
50. The impetus for the large increase in illegal migration to the United States is usually attributed to
the termination of the Bracero program in 1964. On the Bracero program, see generally KITrY CALAVITA,
INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND THE I.N.S. (1992). There presumably
were some illegal aliens early in the century-those who evaded the nonnumerical restrictions imposed by
federal law since 1875 and by state law since much earlier. See generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost
Century ofAmerican Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1833 (1993) (explaining pre-1875
immigration laws). As to the latter category, however, see Schuck Testimony, supra note 3, at 2 n.2.
51. This illegal immigration accounts for at least one-third of all population growth due to
immigration. Espenshade, supra note 37, at 200-01.
52. ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 35-38, 43-45.
53. For this figure, see the graph entitled "Rate of immigration by decade, 1820-1990" in John J.
Miller & Stephen Moore, The Index of Leading Immigration Indicators, in STRANGERS AT OUR GATE:
IMMIGRATION IN THE 1990S, at 100, 103 (John J. Miller ed., 1994) (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1992 tbl. 5 (1992)). These figures
are clearly based only on legal immigration.
54. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MARCH 1994 CURRENT POPULATION
SURVEY, cited in MARTIN, supra note 43, at 1.
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percentage of the foreign-born remains far below the 13.2% share it comprised
in 1920, it is the highest percentage since then, and the foreign-born share has
almost doubled since 1970, when it was 4.8%." The fact that one out of
every eleven persons in the United States is a first-generation immigrant gives
immigration a much higher political and media profile today than it possessed
only a quarter-century ago, when fewer than one in twenty were foreign-born.
Brimelow, however, does not simply ground his demand for drastic
restriction on the size of the post-1965 cohort. He also claims that this newer
immigration is fundamentally different from that which preceded it in two
other respects: its continuity and its racial composition.
Continuity. One of the book's principal themes is that America has not
always been a country that admitted immigrants. The traditional notion that
there has been a steady stream of immigrants to the United States is one of
those hoary, politically useful (to some) myths. The truth is that immigration
to the United States has always come in waves-that is, until Congress
unleashed the tsunami of 1965.56 Beginning in the colonial period,
immigration exhibited recurrent cycles of growth and decline. The many peaks
and valleys were sensitive to conditions in Europe and job opportunities in the
United States. When jobs were plentiful, immigrants came, many only as
sojourners; when jobs were scarce, many of the earlier immigrants returned to
the old country, and few new immigrants arrived. This punctuated pattern of
immigration-occasional spurts followed by short-term "pauses" or longer
"lulls"5 -resulted mostly from the convulsions of war and the business
cycle. 8 This pattern was also socially benign. Like the period between meals,
the pauses and lulls facilitated digestion, a process that would have been far
more dangerous and uncomfortable had the newcomers entered America's maw
in large and constant gulps. Americans could more readily accept immigrants,
who in turn had the time, space, and incentive to assimilate swiftly into
American society.
Like almost every other good thing in Brimelow's account, however, this
Edenic paradise of leisurely assimilation ended abruptly in (you guessed it!)
1965. Far from being wave-like, the post-1965 immigration has waxed but
55. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 1994 tbl. 54 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 U.S. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. This percentage approximates
the foreign-born share of 8.6% in Germany in 1994. Rainer Miinz & Rolf Ulrich, Changing Patterns of
Migration: The Case of Germany, 1945-1994, in OPENING THE DOOR: U.S. AND GERMAN POLICIES ON THE
ABSORPTION AND INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS (Peter H. Schuck et al. eds., forthcoming 1996)
[hereinafter OPENING THE DOOR] (MtInz & Ulrich manuscript at 34, on file with author). The foreign-born
share in Canada is much higher. See CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION, supra note 16, tbl. A.9 at 420 (15.4%
share in 1986).
56. Brimelow's account of immigration waves appears primarily in ALIEN NATION, supra note I, at
29-33.
57. 1994 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 29, tbl. I at 25.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 62-64.
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never waned; even now it shows no sign of receding.59 The flow has been
both continuous and continually rising (short-term fluctuations aside). In
particular, the business cycle has had little effect on this immigration flow.
60
Brimelow has a ready explanation for this new development: In addition to
jobs, the welfare magnet both attracts immigrants and keeps them here. 6' If
Brimelow is correct about this-if immigrants' motives have changed and the
business cycle no longer disciplines immigration flows-the implications for
both immigration and welfare policy would be far-reaching. But is it true?
Brimelow seeks to persuade us with strong assertions and vivid charts that
draw our attention to the contrasting peaks and valleys before 1965 and the
continuous ramping upward thereafter.62 The unwary reader, however, should
be forewarned: There is less to this evidence than meets the eye.63 First, the
major declines in immigration occurred during periods of either world war
(1915-20, 1940-45) or deep economic depression (after 1873 and 1893, and
during the 1930s).64 Because we have managed since 1965 to avoid both of
these evils-a point to which I shall return in the Conclusion-Brimelow
cannot show that the historical responsiveness of immigration to the business
cycle no longer operates. Only a new world war or depression can test his
claim.
Second, the pre-1965 trough may not have been as deep as the numbers
suggest. No numerical restrictions on immigration from the western hemisphere
even existed before 1965, and thus any number of Mexicans could enter the
United States legally by paying a fee, passing a Spanish literacy test, and
obtaining a labor certification. Presumably, many did not bother to do so and
instead entered illegally, which could not have been too difficult at a time
when the Border Patrol was much smaller and less effective than it is today.
Even if many did not enter the United States illegally, they were not counted
in the totals contained in the official statistics. It is, therefore, a delicious
irony, unremarked by Brimelow, that the same 1965 Act that he so thoroughly
deplores also imposed a numerical restriction very much to his liking.
Third, the charts do not really tell us much about whether the causes of
immigration fluctuations changed over time. We know that other things did not
59. ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 38. Unless, of course, Congress enacts pending legislation to
restrict legal immigration. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
60. Id. at 33. Nathan Glazer makes the same claim. See Nathan Glazer, Immigration and the American
Future, PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1995, at 45, 53 ("The rise and fall of the business cycle and employment
still plays some role in immigration, but it is a surprisingly small one.").
61. ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 33, 39, 42.
62. See, e.g., id. chart I at 30-31, chart 2 at 32. Brimelow calls chart 2 "a ramp.., or a springboard."
Id. at 33 (ellipsis in original).
63. I mean this literally, as well as figuratively. The charts are scaled in a way that can easily mislead
the reader. The scale makes the troughs seem deeper than they were in absolute terms, and the scale
exaggerates the significance of the inevitable short-term fluctuations. Brimelow's trompe I'oeil is
particularly egregious in chart 1, see id. at 30-31, chart 3, see id. at 34, and chart 5, see id. at 42, although
this problem plagues many of his diagrams.
64. See 1994 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 29, tbl. 1.
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remain equal; for example, the legal rules governing immigration were in flux.
Shortly after numerical limits on immigration were established in the mid-
1920s,65 the Great Depression drove immigration levels down, and World
War II kept them low. Thus, the numerical caps could not really have begun
to bite until the late 1940s, more than twenty years after their inception, at
which point a different, more complex mix of factors (including massive
refugee resettlements) were shaping immigration flows.
Finally, Brimelow's claim that the welfare state explains immigration's
relentless rise during the post-1965 period is hard to square with the fact that
this ramping up began in the 1950s, long before the Great Society expansion
of the welfare state commenced.
Nevertheless, Brimelow might be correct that the business cycle no longer
regulates immigration flows as it once did,66 and that a legally mandated
pause in immigration would enable the United States to better integrate the
large post-1965 cohort. Such a new pause might facilitate the successful
assimilation of this cohort, much as the pre-1920s cohort benefited from the
earlier lull. A new pause might also ease immigration-related social anxieties
resulting from the constant addition of newcomers. 67 Group mobility theory,
the historical pattern of assimilation, and common sense lend some plausibility
to this notion. It is intriguing that immigrants themselves-by a large
majority-believe that immigration should either be kept at present levels or
reduced, and support for this position increases with their time in the United
States. 68 Whether immigrants possess some special insight into how large-
scale, continuing immigration retards the assimilation of recent immigrants, or
simply wish for selfish reasons to pull up the ladder now that they have
climbed aboard, is unclear.
The attractiveness of a pause, however, depends in part on how the pause
is defined and on its duration. Brimelow's approach is to permit either no
immigration or only skills-based admissions (the reader can't be sure).69
Others, however, will see no magic, and much mischief, in terminating all
family-based and humanitarian admissions. For those categories, a more
65. As noted above, nonnumerical restrictions had constrained immigration even before Congress
began to regulate immigration in 1875. See supra note 50.
66. For some supporting evidence, which the authors view as "preliminary," see James F. Hollifield
& Gary Zuk, The Political Economy of Immigration: Electoral, Labor, and Business Cycle Effects on Legal
Immigration in the United States 11-16 (Sept. 1995) (unpublished paper presented at migration workshop
sponsored by Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, University of Amsterdam, on file with author).
67. See ALIEN NATION, supra note I, at 211-16. For example, he points to historical patterns of
increased intermarriage of Chinese immigrants and whites in the South after immigration had been
interrupted for a long period of time. Id. at 270.
68. The Immigrant Experience, Am. ENTERPRISE, Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 102, 103 (relating May-June
1995 survey in which 66% of immigrants here for decade or less expressed this view). The comparable
figure for non-immigrant Americans, according to a different survey in June 1995, was 89%. Id.
69. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. Compare ALIEN NATION, supra note I, at 261
(proposing that only immigrants with skills be admitted) with id. at 261-62 (proposing moratorium on
immigration, or a lull at minimum).
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modest reduction in immigration, one that is temporary and whose overall
effects can then be gauged, would almost certainly reconcile the competing
considerations better than complete cessation.
Brimelow's effort to shift the burden of proof to defenders of immigration
by appealing to social risk aversion also relies on a simplistic all-or-nothing
approach. On the final page of his book, in a section entitled "What If?,"
Brimelow argues that immigration's uncertain effects argue for terminating or
radically restricting it. If immigration advocates turn out to be wrong, he
suggests, we will be left with many disastrous and perhaps irreversible
consequences, whereas if the restrictionists are wrong, the worst that will
happen is that the United States must deal with a labor shortage. Risk
aversion is a perfectly legitimate policy criterion, and if one shared Brimelow's
views of immigration's effects, one might well accept this effort to shift the
burden of proof. If instead one believes, as I do, that legal immigration is on
the whole desirable, the more relevant policy criterion-one that should be
particularly congenial to a conservative like Brimelow-becomes "if it ain't
broke, don't fix it"--or, more precisely, "if it's just partly broke, just fix that
part."
Racial Composition. To Brimelow, the most disturbing aspect of the Fall
is the changing racial complexion of the United States. Before 1965, he notes,
immigrants came overwhelmingly from the traditional source countries of
northern and western Europe. In those glory days, "not all immigrants were
alien to American eyes," and "native-born Americans were receiving
continuous ethnic reinforcement." 71 But since the abandonment of the national
origins quotas in 1965, the vast majority of newcomers have been Hispanic
and Asian,72 with a significant new black inflow from Africa and the non-
70. Id. at 275.
71. Id. at 59. This historical vision of a white brotherhood into which earlier waves of white
immigrants from southern and eastern Europe were readily inducted is, of course, a wholly misleading and
pernicious account of the undisguised hostility that greeted so many of those who happened to be swarthier,
poorer, and religiously different than the Americans of that time and who Brimelow, without recognizing
the irony, now includes in the desirable "white" category. See generally NATHAN GLAZER & DANIEL
PATRICK MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING POT: THE NEGROES, PUERTO RICANS, JEWS, ITALIANS, AND
IRISH OF NEv YORK CITY 137-216 (2d ed. 1970); JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS
OF AMERICAN NATIvISM, 1860-1925 (Rutgers Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1988) (1955). In contrast to Brimelow,
some strident conservatives forthrightly acknowledge this history of discrimination. See, e.g., THOMAS
SOWVELL, ETHNIC AMERICA: A HISTORY (1981).
72. Immigration analysts commonly speak of "Hispanics" and "Asians." It is exceedingly important,
however, to recognize the enormous ethnic, linguistic, religious, national origin, and other diversities within
these broad groupings, and even within narrower classifications such as South Asians. Indeed, these
diversities are so great as to render such labels virtually meaningless for most purposes, and often
misleading. The Census Bureau and other researchers have adopted these rubrics and use them to organize
important immigration data. Political actors have also found them quite serviceable. See YEN LE ESPIRITU,
ASIAN AMERICAN PANETHNICITY: BRIDGING INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITIES 112-33 (1992); PETER SKERRY,
MEXICAN-AMERICANS: THE AMBIVALENT MINORITY 25-26 (1993); Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Rights and
Immigration: Challenges for the Latino Community in the Tiveny-First Century, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 42, 67-72
(1995). Not surprisingly, the law has fallen into line. In this essay, I reluctantly accede to these most
arbitrary and distorting, but largely inescapable, conventional rubrics.
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Spanish Caribbean. In what he calls the Pincer Chart,73 he shows (while
acknowledging the uncertainties of long-term demographic projections) that
whites, who were 81% of the population in 1790 and 75.7% in 1990, will
decline to a bare majority (52.7%) in 2050.' 4 Well before then, moreover,
Hispanics will replace blacks as the largest single minority group. Brimelow
then has the immigration liberal pose the key question: "So what? Why do you
care so much about race?"75 This is the essential question, and Brimelow
provides several answers. In particular, he points to the reinforcement and
distortion of affirmative action effected by immigration and to immigration's
threat to social cohesion. Because these issues impinge most significantly on
cultural assimilation and political power, however, I defer discussion of them
to Parts IV and V.
II. CARRYING CAPACITY
Continued immigration, Brimelow despairs, will be a demographic and
environmental disaster for the United States.76 Nevertheless, although his
warnings are certainly worth attending to, his predictions are highly arbitrary
and unrealistic; he aims more to shock than to persuade. Interestingly, his
predictions bear a striking resemblance to certain modes of argument-use of
simplistic extrapolations from present to future, disregard for the complexity
and subtlety of social adaptations, and presentation of stark doomsday
scenarios-that conservatives properly mock when environmentalists and other
social reformers advance them.
The centerpiece of Brimelow's analysis is a chart that he calls "The
Wedge," 77 which relies on projections developed by Leon Bouvier, a
respected demographer and leading immigration restrictionist.78 Had we
terminated all immigration in 1970, Brimelow's "Wedge" purports to show, the
U.S. population in 2050 would have been 244 million (i.e., less than the
current total). But continuing immigration at present levels, he predicts, will
73. The pincer image refers to two arms-one consisting of Hispanics, the other consisting of blacks
and Asians-bearing down upon the white population and gradually squeezing it into a minority position.
74. ALIEN NATION, supra note I, chart 12 at 63. Oddly, he counts Hispanics (21.1% in 2050) as
nonwhites in the Pincer Chart, yet only four pages later he notes that almost half of all Hispanics in the
1990 census counted themselves as whites, id. at 67, and he subsequently points out, quite rightly, the
larger absurdity of a "Hispanic" category, id. at 218. Although he does not say so, the "Asian" rubric is
even more absurd, as it aggregates into one meaningless category groups that do not even share a common
language, as do Hispanics.
75. Id. at 66.
76. The demographic parade of horribles that results from immigration is a recurrent theme of
Brimelow's book. For his discussion of the environmental consequences in particular, see id. at 187-90.
77. See id. chart 8 at 47.
78. For an example of Bouvier's empirical work, see LEON F. BOUVIER & LINDSEY GRANT, How
MANY AMERICANS? POPULATION, IMMIGRATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1994). Other restrictionist
writings draw heavily on this work. See, e.g., ROY BECK, RE-CHARTING AMERICA'S FUTURE: RESPONSES
TO ARGUMENTS AGAINST STABILIZING U.S. POPULATION AND LIMITING IMMIGRATION (1994) (citing six
Bouvier sources throughout book).
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produce a total in 2050 of 383 million, of which 36% will be post-1970
immigrants and their descendants. The "Wedge" consists of the additional 139
million Americans who will have descended from post-1970 immigrants,79
unneeded and unwanted bodies that will place an unprecedented strain on the
natural and human environments. He also predicts that more immigrants,
especially those from the Third World whom the post-1965 rules have brought
here, will bring new (and in some cases, old) diseases, high rates of fertility
and crime, and low rates of education and skill. They will crowd out the rest
of us, swamping our classrooms, extending our slums, polluting our air, and
destroying our amenities and communities. 80 These dire consequences, he
says, are already occurring.
Straight-line extrapolations from the present could indeed yield 383 million
people in fifty-five more years. This is a lot of people, and the prospect of
somehow squeezing all of them into our schools, beaches, parking spaces, and
housing stock is not a pleasant one. Doing so would surely strain our natural
and social environments. But straight-line extrapolations in such matters
seldom prove to be correct. For all the scientific gloss of hard numbers,
demography is as much art as science. Long-term demographic projections,
like economic ones, are necessary and often valuable. Nevertheless, they
necessarily assume that human choices are more fixed than they actually are
and that the future will therefore be much like the recent past and present
(except, of course, for such changes as the demographer can envision and
accurately predict). Wise demographers know and say that this assumption is
false, but they usually have little choice but to proceed as if it were true.
Demographic projections such as those cited by Brimelow emphasize the
population-increasing effects of those immigrant groups whose fertility rates
are higher than the fertility rates of natives. These higher rates reflect the
greater proportion of immigrants, relative to the general population, who are
in their childbearing years, cultural factors, and other causes. When high-
fertility groups' share of the immigration stream and of the total U.S.
population increases, the projected future population of the United States
increases accordingly. This "shifting shares" phenomenon-the larger
proportion in the population of high-fertility groups such as Filipinos, southeast
Asians, and some Hispanics-drives much of the prediction of future U.S.
population growth."'
This argument, however, resembles earlier "race suicide" theories that
immigration historians and demographers have convincingly debunked by
showing that immigrant fertility rates generally converge with those of the
79. See ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 47.
80. Id. at 151-55, 186-90.
81. See, e.g., BOUVIER & GRANT, supra note 78, at 73; LEON BOUVIER, IMMIGRATION AND RISING
U.S. FERTILITY: A PROSPECT OF UNENDING POPULATION GROWTH 2-11 (Center for Immigration Studies
Backgrounder No. 1-91, 1991).
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native population.82 The important question, therefore, is how quickly this
occurs. It appears that when women from high-fertility countries migrate to the
United States, they both reduce and delay their childbearing to the point at
which their fertility rates approach the overall U.S. norm. Indeed, compared
to demographically similar native women, their rates sometimes are lower.
83
Admittedly, immigrants do accelerate U.S. population growth; since 1980, net
immigration has accounted for about 37% of population growth.84 But the
extent and speed of their contribution to that growth in the future are difficult
to predict and easy to exaggerate.
Much of Brimelow's concern about carrying capacity seems to relate to the
dangers of overcrowding. Even thirty years after the dreaded deluge began,
however, the United States remains a country with a relatively low population
density.86 This concern does not simply reflect the vast uninhabited (and
perhaps uninhabitable 87) spaces in the American West. Even America's
largest and densest cities are thinly populated relative to other cities in the
world, including the most famously attractive ones.88 Indeed, the population
density of New York City is about half what it was in 1910; other major cities
are also less densely populated.89 We have a long way to go before we reach
density levels that other Western democracies find perfectly acceptable, even
desirable. Our standards of acceptable density may be different from those in
Europe, but our standards are not immutable, as the historical urbanization,
suburbanization, and "edge city" cycles in the United States attest.
82. See Tamara K. Hareven & John Modell, Family Patterns, in HARVARD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS 345, 348-49 (Stephan Thernstrom et al. eds., 1980) [hereinafter HARVARD
ENCYCLOPEDIA].
83. See, e.g., Francine D. Blau, The Fertility of Immigrant Women: Evidence from High-Fertility
Source Countries, in IMMIGRATION AND THE WORK FORCE 93, 126 (George J. Borjas & Richard B.
Freeman eds., 1992) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION AND THE WORK FORCE]. A recent study claims that the
experience of immigrant women in struggling against discrimination significantly reduced their fertility in
the United States. See Thomas J. Espenshade & Wenzhen Ye, Differential Fertility Within an Ethnic
Minority: The Effect of "Trying Harder" Among Chinese-American women, 41 SOC. PROBS. 97 (1994).
84. Espenshade, supra note 37, at 201; Passel, supra note 37, at 116. An additional 20% of U.S.
population growth resulted from births to immigrants.
85. ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 188-89.
86. In 1994, the United States had 74 people per square mile, compared to 623 in the United Kingdom
and 275 in France, which are hardly countries that one thinks of as crowded. 1994 U.S. STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT, supra note 55, tbl. 1351.
87. I say "perhaps" because throughout American history, land previously thought to be uninhabitable
was successfully developed for residential and other uses. Sections of Washington, D.C., and many other
American cities were reclaimed from swampland, and cities such as Los Angeles, Salt Lake City, and Las
Vegas were built in the most forbidding desert conditions.
88. In 1992, the population per square mile in New York City, the most densely populated in the
United States, was 11,482; the corresponding densities for London and Paris were 10,490 and 19,883,
respectively. The figure for Hong Kong, the most densely populated-and one of the richest-in the world,
was 250,524. 1994 U.S. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 55, tbl. 1355.
89. Chicago was slightly more densely populated in 1990 than in 1920, but less so than in 1930. I am
grateful to Professor Thomas Muller for supplying me with these data, which are based on his research
comparing figures from the first few decades of this century as reported in the 1930 U.S. census with
population data for 1992.
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Demographic extrapolations from the present to the future are further
confounded by the dynamics of markets, politics, and other powerful social
processes that respond to developments that impose widespread social costs.
These processes do not sit idly by while change unfolds but instead shape and
constrain change, thereby altering its future trajectory. Demographic models
cannot readily incorporate this fact, which is nicely captured in "Stein's Law"
(stated by economist Herbert Stein): If a trend can't go on like this
indefinitely, it won't.90 Population growth, for example, bids up the prices of
housing, education, and other goods; people therefore tend to have fewer
children,91 other things being equal.92 If increased job competition pushes
immigrants' unemployment high enough for long enough, they will tend not
to migrate here. If competition for natural resources and other environmental
goods becomes more intense, those goods will become more costly, which both
rations their use and attracts additional supply; these behavioral responses in
turn tend to reduce the price. If policymakers perceive that population growth
harms the environment, the economy, and other areas of public concern, they
will propose policy changes accordingly.
I am not suggesting that we can blithely count on these responses to
eliminate any adverse effects of population growth-far from it. How well
society reacts to these developments depends on the quality of information
flows, the nature of politics, the efficiency of markets, and other factors. Even
if optimal outcomes are unlikely under these conditions, however, Brimelow's
dire predictions should be taken with more than a grain of salt. If our politics
and markets are supple and responsive enough to react swiftly and intelligently
to population pressures and other strains on carrying capacity, the future need
not unduly arouse our fears. Indeed, since 1965, our social institutions have
performed reasonably well in this regard, refuting the Chicken Littles of
environmental pessimism.93
I. ECONOMIC IMPACTS
Brimelow acknowledges the rich contributions that the pre-1965
immigrants have made to the American economy.94 He insists, however, that
the post-1965 cohort is altogether different. Relying heavily and uncritically
on the work of labor economist George Borjas, he argues that "the effect of
the 1965 reform has been to uncouple legal immigration from the needs of the
90. See, e.g., Herbert Stein, Health Care Basics, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 29, 1994, at GI.
91. This has been the pattern in other countries such as Japan, where housing is scarce.
92. This ceteris paribus condition, of course, applies to all such predictive statements.
93. See infra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
94. See ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 216 ("[Ithe American experience with immigration has been
a triumphant success.").
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U.S. economy."'95 This claim is actually a composite of four separate claims.
The first is that labor market skills play a small and shrinking role in
admissions policy. Second, the post-1965 cohort is less skilled than earlier
cohorts. Third and related, the post-1965 cohort drains the economy more than
earlier cohorts because its members, especially illegal aliens, are more likely
to demand public assistance and displace native workers. Fourth, this
displacement imposes particularly heavy burdens on current and potential
African-American workers.
The first claim is correct. A major theme of the debate surrounding the
Immigration Act of 1990 was the need to increase the level and relative share
of skills-based admissions.96 In the end, however, the Act only slightly
increased the share of these admissions. In 1994, only 15% of admissions were
skills-based; moreover, roughly half of these consisted of skilled immigrants'
accompanying family members, who may themselves lack skills needed in the
United States. Family ties accounted for 62% of the admissions. 97 Because
the 1990 Act substantially increased both the total number of immigrants and
the numbers authorized for each immigrant category, the absolute number of
skills-based immigrants did grow, thus obscuring how minimally the share of
skills-based admissions had increased. Family unity, it appears, continues to
trump all other immigration policy values.98 Pending legislation would
increase the relative weight of labor market skills, a reform whose advantages
are widely appreciated. 99
The second claim-that the "quality" of immigrants to the United States
has declined since the 1965 reforms-is harder to assess. Good data on
immigrant labor markets are hard to come by, and analyses are very sensitive
to methodology. More to the point, labor economists disagree about the nature
and validity of the data, methodology, and conclusions used by Borjas and
other immigration analysts. There are several areas of dispute. One concerns
the extent to which the "immigrant" category should be disaggregated.
Different subcategories of immigrants-family-based admittees, skills-based
admittees, refugees/asylees, age groups, source region or country groups, legals
versus illegals-in a given cohort exhibit quite different characteristics.
Lumping some or all of these subcategories together can significantly affect
the outcome of the analysis. Reliance on census data, which employ rather
95. Id. at 141.
96. See Peter H. Schuck, The Politics of Rapid Legal Change: Immigration Policy in the 1980s,
6 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 37, 86-89 (1992).
97. Telephone Interview with Hoefer, supra note 35.
98. Schuck, supra note 96, at 88.
99. E.g., S. 1394, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), which passed the Senate Subcommittee on
Immigration on Nov. 29, 1995. See 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1605 (Dec. 4, 1995). Senator Simpson's
effort to reduce employment-based admissions has failed. See Eric Schmitt, Author ofImmigration Measure
in Senate Drops Most'Provisions on Foreign Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1996, at A20.
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crude, self-reported ethnic categories and almost certainly understate income,
is also controversial.
Several generalizations growing out of labor market research do support
some of Brimelow's concerns. Many post-1965 immigrants are highly
educated, indeed, far more so than the native population. Many others are more
skilled in absolute terms than the immigrants who preceded them, but because
the native population's skills have increased even more in absolute terms and
because lower skilled groups comprise a larger share of the total immigration
flow, the "quality" gap has widened in relative terms. 00 Most of the
immigrants who entered illegally-those who qualified for the amnesty under
IRCA and those who have entered illegally since then-are low-skilled
Mexicans. The education level of Mexican-origin immigrants, even among
those who are naturalized U.S. citizens, is very low; overall, it averages about
seven and a half years of schooling.' Other relatively low-skilled immigrant
groups are Asian refugees and the elderly.0 2 On the other hand, the recent
arrivals also include better educated individuals-predominantly nonrefugees
from Asia, Africa, and the Middle East-who should help to reduce the gap
in the future.'0 3 This effect, however, will be gradual because their numbers
remain relatively low. Again, pending legislation is likely to increase the skill
levels of future immigrant cohorts.
Brimelow's third claim is that post-1965 immigrants inflict a net loss on
the economy, taking into account the combined effects of their use of public
services, their displacement of native workers, their tax payments, and their
contribution to productivity. This claim is also difficult to assess precisely, as
the existing studies seldom employ comparable definitions, measures, data sets,
100. See George J. Borjas, National Origin and the Skills of Immigrants in the Postwar Period, in
IMMIGRATION AND THE WORK FORCE, supra note 83, at 17.
101. Frank D. Bean et al., Educational and Sociodemographic Incorporation Among Hispanic
Immigrants to the United States, in IMMIGRATION AND ETHNICrrY: THE INTEGRATION OF AMERICA'S
NEwEST ARRIVALS 73, tbls. 3.1, 3.2 at 81-82 (Barry Edmonston & Jeffrey S. Passel eds., 1994)
[hereinafter IMMIGRATION AND ETHNICrrY]. Although this figure is based on census data from 1986 and
1988, the same data indicate that the education level of the Mexican-origin groups declined substantially
from that of earlier cohorts of Mexican-origin immigrants, thereby "lend[ing] support to the contention that
at least some immigrant groups are less skilled than either other immigrant groups or earlier entrants for
the same group." Id. at 86. These data suggest that "immigration no longer selects for relatively better
educated Mexicans." Id. at 93. Another disturbing finding is that the educational attainment of third-
generation Hispanics, a group dominated by Mexican-Americans, was actually lower than that of their
parents, suggesting that the hard-won progress of the second generation does not necessarily continue in
the third. Id. at 94; cf. infra notes 150-56 and accompanying text (noting need to distinguish among first,
second, and third generations of immigrants in evaluating linguistic assimilation).
102. For a comparative study of the skill levels of Asian immigrant national groups that uses years
of education as a proxy for skill, see Sharon M. Lee & Barry Edmonston, The Socioeconomic Status and
Integration of Asian Immigrants, in IMMIGRATION AND ETHNICrrY, supra note 101, at 101, 112-14 & tbl.
4.3 at 113.
103. Alejandro Portes, Divergent Destinies: Immigration, Poverty, and the Second Generation 7 (Sept.
1995) (unpublished paper prepared for German-American Project on Immigration and Refugees, on file with
author).
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and methodologies.104 For example, the outcomes of labor market impact
analyses depend on whether the studies assume that particular labor markets
(usually metropolitan areas) are closed systems, or whether they instead
consider the significant possibility (given the high degree of internal labor
mobility in the U.S. economy) that immigrant concentrations in one area
induce some native workers to leave that area and discourage other natives
who might otherwise migrate there from doing so.
Another controversial question of great political interest concerns
immigrants' use of public services and benefits. Immigrant households are
somewhat more likely to use welfare (AFDC and SSI) than native ones.
Although this differential is small (7.5% of natives, 8.7% of immigrants), it
increased during the 1980s as immigrant utilization rates grew and native rates
declined. And in a very recent survey, immigrants self-report much higher
utilization rates. 05 A number of earlier studies had found that if one controls
for socioeconomic variables, immigrants were less likely than otherwise
demographically similar natives to receive AFDC and SSI. 0 6 A very recent
study using 1990 data indicates that this pattern of lower immigrant welfare
utilization continues to be true for AFDC but not for SSI. t07 Immigrants now
receive SSI at higher rates than demographically similar natives, a development
that has generated strong public and congressional reaction. 0 8 Like the
growing relative quality gap discussed earlier, the higher immigrant utilization
of SSI is mostly due to the very large Mexican cohort and to the Asian refugee
cohort, whose utilization rates more than doubled during the 1980s."0 9
104. For a discussion of this problem as it appears in the leading studies, see GEORGES VERNEZ &
KEVIN F. MCCARTHY, THE COSTS OF IMMIGRATION To TAXPAYERS: ANALYTICAL AND POLICY ISSUES
(RAND Center for Research on Immigration Policy, MR-705-Ff/IF, 1996).
105. Eighteen percent of those in the United States for a decade or less have received food stamps,
Medicaid, AFDC, and similar aid; 22% of those in United States for 11-20 years have received such aid;
and 17% of those in United States for 21 years or more have benefited from such programs. See The
Immigrant Experience, supra note 68, at 103.
106. Of course, even if this pattern of lower incidence of welfare utilization by immigrants were true,
it would simply raise anew the question of immigrant "quality." See discussion supra notes 100-03 and
accompanying text.
107. See Michael Fix & Jeffrey S. Passel, Who's on the Dole? It's Not Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 3, 1994, at B7 (summarizing results of study based on 1990 census data).
108. See, e.g., Welfare Revision: Hearing Before Human Resources Subcomm. of House Ways and
Means Comm., 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (Jan. 27, 1995) (statement of Jane L. Ross, Director, Income Security
Issues, General Accounting Office) (detailing dramatic growth in immigrants' claims), available in LEXIS,
News Library, Cumws File; Ashley Dunn, For Elderly Immigrants, a Retirement Plan in U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 16, 1995, at 1 (same). Pending legislation in both houses of Congress would restrict immigrants' SSI
eligibility. See S. 269, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203 (1995); H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202 (1995).
109. Frank D. Bean et al., Country-of-Origin, Type of Public Assistance and Patterns of Welfare
Recipiency Among U.S. Immigrants and Natives 17-18 & tbl. 4 at 30 (unpublished paper of Population
Research Center, University of Texas-Austin, on file with author). The authors note that the absolute
increase in Mexican SSI use reflected the great increase in the number of Mexican immigrants during the
decade rather than any increased propensity of the average Mexican immigrant to use it. Id. at 13-14.
Indeed, the rate of SSI use among Mexican immigrants actually declined over the decade. Nevertheless,
the sheer growth in the Mexican cohort, coupled with its higher-than-immigrant-average utilization rate,
drove the overall immigrant rate higher. Id. On the other hand, the number of Asian refugees has already
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A number of studies have attempted to determine whether immigrants on
balance benefit or burden the U.S. economy. Brimelow, citing a highly
disputed analysis by Donald Huddle" and a puzzling "back-of-the-envelope"
estimate by Borjas, obviously thinks that the burdens predominate."' Urban
Institute researchers Jeffrey Passel and Rebecca Clark recently reviewed the
estimates made by Huddle and by state and local governments seeking
reimbursement of immigration-related costs from the federal government."
2
Passel and Clark severely criticize these estimates for systematically
understating tax collections from immigrants; overstating service costs for
immigrants; failing to take account of the economic value generated by
immigrant entrepreneurs and immigrant consumer spending; overstating job
displacement impacts; overstating the size of the immigrant population,
especially illegals; and ignoring the fact that natives also use more in services
than they pay in taxes." 3 In particular, they find that Huddle underestimates
the taxes paid by immigrants by $50 billion!1"4 Correcting this error alone,
Passel and Clark argue, would defeat the claim that immigrants cost more than
they contribute. Indeed, they estimate that the post-1970 immigrants-legal,
amnestied, and undocumented-generate a surplus of $27.4 billion a year, not
including nontax economic benefits." 5
The large gap between these estimates reflects some quite technical
methodological judgments by researchers. It would be foolish to allow
immigration policy to turn on such judgments, especially since neither
Huddle's cost estimate nor Passel and Clark's benefit estimate would count for
much in a $7 trillion economy. Even so, there is no denying the political
significance of these numbers: Public attitudes toward immigration are less
favorable to the extent that immigrants are perceived to impose even small
burdens on the economy and on taxpayers. Recent congressional actions
declined and may be even lower in the future. See 1994 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 29, at
75 (supplying statistics for Vietnamese and Laotian refugees, two of largest Asian refugee groups).
110. Donald Huddle, The Costs of Immigration (July 1993) (unpublished paper prepared for the
Carrying Capacity Network, on file with author). For a sampling of the controversy surrounding Huddle's
analysis, see JANE L. Ross, ILLEGAL ALIENS-NATIONAL NET COST ESTIMATES VARY WIDELY,
GAO/IHEHS-95-133 (July 25, 1995), available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
I11. See ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 151-53.
112. Jeffrey S. Passel & Rebecca L. Clark, How Much Do Immigrants Really Cost? A Reappraisal
of Huddle's "The Cost of Immigrants" (Feb. 1994) (unpublished research report, on file with author).
113. See id.
114. Id. at 3.
115. Id. at 2. In turn, the Center for Immigration Studies, which has worked closely with Huddle, has
responded to Passel and Clark with new estimates, focusing on immigrants' future claims against Social
Security, that find a net burden of $29.1 billion. CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, THE COSTS OF
IMMIGRATION: ASSESSING A CONFLICTED ISSUE 1, 19 (Center for Immigration Studies Backgrounder No. 2-
94, 1994). The Center and other restrictionists have often pointed in recent years to the faltering economy
in California, where a large percentage of the post-1965 immigrants have settled, as evidence of their
negative economic effects. It remains to be seen how the strong resurgence of California's economy, see
James Stemgold, Recovery in California Wears a New Costume, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1996, at CIO, will
affect these restrictionist arguments.
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confirm a strong consensus that immigrants (or their sponsors) should at least
pay for themselves."
t 6
The fourth claim-that post-1965 immigrants may displace many African-
American workers" 7-might seem almost self-evidently true. After all, low-
skilled immigrants and low-skilled blacks would appear to compete for a
shrinking number of low-skill jobs. The terms of this competition, moreover,
often favor even non-English speaking immigrants, especially illegals.
Immigrants are accustomed to, and may accept, lower wages, and many
employers perceive them to be more reliable, hard-working, and docile than
native black workers"t t8
Much depends on the extent to which immigrant labor is a substitute for
or a complement to native labor. If immigrant labor is a substitute, immigrants
would increase unemployment among blacks (who unlike unsuccessful
immigrants have no other home to which to return) and would, other things
being equal, drive down wage levels for those blacks who are hired. Such
effects would be consistent with studies indicating that real wages have
declined for low-skill workers during much of the post-1965 period, and
especially with studies concluding that recent immigration has contributed to
the widening earnings gap between high-skill and low-skill workers." 9 But
to the extent that immigrant labor instead complements native labor, immigrant
labor would increase job opportunities for natives, including blacks. This
increase might occur if immigrants fill labor niches that native workers are
abandoning or if immigrants develop new entrepreneurial enclaves. There is
evidence that both of these possibilities often occur. 20 Indeed, during the
1980s, immigrant groups seem to have competed more with each other than
they did with native workers.'
2'
Empirical studies have consistently failed to establish significant
immigration-induced harm to native black workers. 22 Nevertheless, various
116. Congress is insisting that sponsors of family-based immigrants be legally responsible in the event
that the immigrants become destitute. See S. 269, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204 (1995); H.R. 4, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 503 (1995).
117. ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 174-75.
118. See, e.g., Joleen Kirschenman & Kathryn M. Neckerman, 'We'd Love to Hire Them, But... ': The
Meaning of Race for Employers, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 203, 204 (Christopher Jeneks & Paul E.
Peterson eds., 1991). For a vivid illustration of this point, see MARY C. WATERS, BLACK LIKE WHO?
(forthcoming 1996) (finding West Indians preferred to African-Americans as employees).
119. See George J. Borjas, The Economic Benefits from Immigration, 9 J. ECON. PERsP. 3, 10 (1995)
(citing other studies).
120. See THOMAS MULLER, IMMIGRANTS AND THE AMERICAN CITY 166-85 (1993).
121. See Elaine Sorensen & Frank D. Bean, The Immigration Reform and Control Act and the Wages
of Mexican Origin Workers: Evidence from Current Population Surveys, 75 SoC. SCl. Q. 1, 16 (1994).
122. After claiming that the post-1965 immigration has contributed to the economic woes of black
workers, ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 173-75, Brimelow exhibits some caution, saying that it is "at
least a possibility," id. at 175. His discussion is entirely one-sided on this point. Reviewing the studies in
1989, Robert Reischauer concluded that "careful and sophisticated analyses by a number of social scientists
provide little evidence that immigrants have had any significant negative impacts on the employment
situation of black Americans." Robert D. Reischauer, Immigration and the Underclass, 501 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 120, 120 (1989) (abstract). A recent study by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
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methodological limitations of those studies, as well as subsequent changes in
economic and immigration factors, mean that such effects cannot be ruled
out.123 The harmful effects, if any, appear to be much too small to justify a
radical change in immigration policy on this ground alone.
IV. CULTURAL ASSIMILATION
Brimelow suggests that the post-1965 immigrants bear, and presumably
transmit to their children, different and less attractive values than did the
earlier waves of immigrants.' 4 Although he is not clear precisely which
values he has in mind, he presumably prefers those that most other people
admire-honesty, industry, family stability, morality, education, optimism
about the future, and respect for law and legitimate authority."z And
although he is a bit vague about the indicia of the decline in immigrants' moral
values, he does mention three areas of particular concern: crime, limited
English proficiency (particularly among Hispanics), and high illegitimacy rates
(particularly among Mexican-Americans). 126 Each of these three areas is
certainly worth worrying about. Immigrant crime may be even worse than he
suggests, and his concern about illegitimacy rates, at least among some
immigrant groups, is warranted. On the other hand, his conclusions about
limited English proficiency are exaggerated, and he fails to discuss the risk of
second-generation attraction to underclass culture, which in the long run may
be the most serious cultural problem of all. I discuss each of these areas in
turn.
A. Crime
The incidence of immigrant crime is significant, if only because the
number of immigrants is large. Most immigrant crime is drug-related. 2 7
however, finds that recent high levels of immmigration are depressing the wages of low-skilled workers.
See Immigrants Contribute to Rising Gap Between Rich and Poor, FAIR IMMIGRATION REPORT, Feb. 1996,
at 6 (citing DAVID JAEGER, SKILL DIFFERENTIALS AND THE EFFECT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE WAGES OF
NATIVES (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor Working Paper No. 273, 1995)). The study
does not appear to have examined the effects of immigration specifically on low- and unskilled African-
American workers.
123. These possibilities are discussed in Frank D. Bean et al., Labor Market Dynamics and the Effects
of Immigration on African Americans, in BLACKS, IMMIGRATION AND RACE RELATIONS (Gerald Jaynes ed.,
forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 5-18, on file with author), which concludes that immigration into tight
labor markets might reduce black unemployment, while immigration into loose ones might increase it.
124. See ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 178-90, 211-18.
125. See, e.g., WATERS, supra note 118 (finding these values to be preferred by immigrants' employers
and co-workers).
126. Id. at 88-89, 145 (English proficiency); id. at 181 (illegitimacy); id. at 182-86 (crime).
127. An estimated 75% of the aliens in federal prisons, compared to 56% of the U.S. citizens there,
are incarcerated for drug-related charges. Criminal Aliens: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International
Law, Immigration and Refugees of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 165 (1994)
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Although the number of criminal aliens under law enforcement supervision in
the United States is impossible to establish precisely, it has increased
approximately ten-fold since 1980, imposing substantial costs of arrest,
detention, and deportation. A 1993 congressional study estimated that 450,000
deportable criminal aliens were either incarcerated, on parole, or on probation
in federal, state, and local jurisdictions. 28 A more conservative compilation
of various federal and state estimates suggests that at least 270,000 deportable
aliens are under criminal justice supervision.'29 Newly convicted aliens, of
course, constantly replenish and enlarge this population. Illegals account for
over half of the deportable aliens in state prisons. 31 Quite apart from other
law enforcement costs, the costs of incarcerating alien criminals are high. The
operating cost alone of a prisoner-year in federal prisons was estimated in early
1994 to be about $19,000.131 If this cost were applied to the 100,000
deportable criminal aliens imprisoned in federal, state, and local facilities,
132
it would mean nearly $2 billion in annual incarceration costs.
Although the systematic data on point are somewhat dated, legal
immigrants do not appear to commit any more crime than demographically
similar Americans; they may even commit less, and that crime may be less
serious. 133 Nor does today's immigrant crime appear to be worse than in
earlier eras. The immigrants who flooded American cities around the turn of
the century (the ancestors of many of today's Americans) were also excoriated
as congenitally vicious and unusually crime-prone, not only by the public
opinion of the day but also by the Dillingham Commission, which Congress
established to report on the need for immigration restrictions." The evidence
[hereinafter 1994 Criminal Aliens Hearing] (testimony of Kathleen Hawk, Director, U.S. Bureau of
Prisons).
128. CriminalAliens in the United States: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations
of the Senate Comm. on Government Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Criminal
Aliens Hearing].
129. See John Williams, The Criminal Alien Problem 1 n.2 (Oct. 20, 1995) (memorandum on file with
author).
130. A recent statistical study of foreign-bom state inmates found that approximately 45% were illegal
aliens. See REBECCA L. CLARK ET AL., FISCAL IMPACTS OF UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS: SELECTED ESTIMATES
FOR SEVEN STATES tbls. 3.2, 3.4 (1994). The INS estimates that 20% of foreign-bom state inmates are not
deportable at all. Removal of Criminal and Illegal Aliens: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Immigration
and Claims of the House Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (Mar. 23, 1995) (testimony of T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service), available in LEXIS, News
Library, Cumws File [hereinafter Aleinikoff Testimony]. This figure suggests that the remaining 35% of
foreign-bom inmates are deportable aliens who are not in illegal status.
131. See 1994 Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 127, at 133 (statement of Rep. Richard H.
Lehman).
132. Aleinikoff Testimony, supra note 130.
133. The data, such as they are, appear in JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
IMMIGRATION 102-03 (1989).
134. On the Dillingham Commission, see MALDWYN ALLEN JONES, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 152-57
(2d ed. 1992).
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suggests that those claims were false then, and similar claims appear to be
false now.'35
These historical and demographic points, however, are largely irrelevant
to the contemporary political debate, which is concerned with the here and
now. Media reports about criminal activity by Asian street gangs, 136 Latin
American drug lords, 137 Islamic terrorists, 138  and Russian mafiosi 139 are
profoundly disturbing to the American public and surely fuel restrictionist
sentiment. In its concern about immigrant crime, as in other respects, the
public often fails to differentiate between legal and illegal aliens.
Two abysmal policy lapses of the federal government have aggravated this
political response. First, the government has failed to police the border and the
interior effectively against illegal aliens, some of whom commit crimes after
entry. Second, the government has failed to expel those legal and illegal
immigrants who have been convicted of deportable offenses in the United
States and who are already in governmental custody. The INS succeeded in
deporting 31,000 criminal aliens in 1995,140 approximately five times as
many as it deported in 1989,'14 but this still amounts to just over 10% of the
deportable aliens under criminal justice supervision. The federal government
is now addressing both of these problems. The Border Patrol has been rapidly
expanded 142 and is implementing some new enforcement techniques. 43 The
INS, spurred by state and congressional pressures, is finally taking active steps
to expedite the removal of criminal aliens; through a combination of new funds
135. See SIMON, supra note 133, at 102-03.
136. See, e.g., John Kifner, Immigrant Waves From Asia Brings an Underworld Ashore, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 6, 1991, at 1 (reporting on Asian gangs in New York).
137. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, Drug Arrests in Colombia Lead to Killings in Queens, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 25, 1995, at 1.
138. See, e.g., Joseph P. Fried, Sheik and 9 Followers Guilty of a Conspiracy of Terrorism, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 1995, at Al.
139. See, e.g., Selwyn Raab, Influx of Russian Gangsters Troubles RB.L in Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 23, 1994, at Al.
140. See Steven A. Holmes, Large Increase in Deportations Occurred in '95, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28,
1995, at Al.
141. See 1993 Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 128, at 77.
142. The Border Patrol now includes 5000 officers, and Congress has instructed the INS to add 1000
more on the Mexican border. MIGRATION NEWs (Jan. 1996) (migrant news PLM <migrant@primal.ucdavis.
edu>).
143. For example, in the El Paso, Texas, sector of the U.S.-Mexico border, the INS in September 1993
implemented "Operation Hold-the-Line," in which Border Patrol officers were stationed every hundred
yards or so along the border. See Joel Brinkley, A Rare Success at the Border Brought Scant Official
Praise, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1994, at Al. The deployment reduced apprehensions of illegals from 700
to around 200 per day. Wayne A. Cornelius et al., Introduction: The Ambivalent Quest for Immigrant
Controls, in CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION, supra note 16, at 3, 35. A 1994 study of "Operation Hold-the-
Line," however, determined that the program had not deterred long-distance immigration, diverting such
immigration instead to other crossing points along the border. James Bomemeier, El Paso Plan Deters
Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIME, July 27, 1994, at A3, A15 (discussing report prepared by Frank Bean and
others for U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform).
The INS has also staged simulations at the southern border of an immigration deluge provoked by
an internal crisis in Mexico. Sam Dillon, U.S. Tests Border Plan in Event of Mexico Crisis, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 1995, at B16.
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and special efforts, the agency hopes to deport 58,000 criminal aliens in
1996."4 Increased efforts by the Border Patrol, however, have been
unsuccessful in the past. 45 The effectiveness of the new campaign, therefore,
remains to be seen. Most recently, the Clinton administration proposed to bar




On the question of immigrants' acquisition of English-language
proficiency, however, Brimelow stands on weaker ground. To be sure, he is
correct that English proficiency is a precondition to full participation in the
economic, political, and cultural aspects of American society. A recent four-
country empirical study confirms the conventional wisdom: Dominant-language
fluency is highly correlated with labor market returns, especially in the United
States. 147 Dominant-language fluency is also important, even if not essential,
to immigrants' full participation in the political process, which, despite some
legal requirements for minority-language voting materials, is still conducted
largely in English.
Brimelow refers to census data indicating that 47% of the U.S. foreign-
born population does not speak English "very well" or "at all" and that 71%
of foreign-born Mexicans report not speaking it "very well."'148 English
fluency is probably the most important step to, and index of, full integration
and participation in American society. It would indeed be a disturbing danger
signal, and an augury of further linguistic fragmentation, if newcomers were
not learning English at an acceptable rate. In any event, the American public
is manifestly unwilling to accept this risk.
149
144. Aleinikoff Testimony, supra note 130; see also Holmes, supra note 140, at D18 (detailing INS's
increased efforts).
145. See Espenshade, supra note 37, at 211-12 (citing data and reasons for failure of enforcement
efforts). Espenshade points out that once an illegal immigrant has taken up residence in the interior, "the
annual probability of being apprehended is roughly 1-2%." Id. at 212. Immigration control efforts in
Europe have also been generally ineffective. See generally CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION, supra note 16,
at 143-97.
146. See Robert Pear, Clinton to Ban Contracts to Companies that Hire Illegal Aliens, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 1996, at A12.
147. Barry R. Chiswick & Paul W. Miller, The Endogeneity Between Language and Earnings:
International Analyses, 12 J. LABOR ECON. 246, 278-79 (1995).
148. ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 88-89.
149. Twenty-two states have already adopted "official English" laws. Joyce Price, English-Only
Advocates Sense Momentum; See Passing Chance for Proposed Bills, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1995, at A2
(listing 22 states). Senator Robert Dole has proposed such a rule at the federal level, id., and other
presidential contenders will not be far behind. Indeed, President Clinton signed such a law for Arkansas
when he was governor of that state. Campaign English from Senator Dole, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1995,
§ 4, at 16. While Dole originally pledged, if elected, to seek to eliminate federal support for bilingual
education, see id., he subsequently toned down his rhetoric to permitting bilingual education programs
"'that ensure that people learn English in a timely fashion,"' Margot Homblower, Putting Tongues in
Cheek. Should Bilingual Education Be Silenced?, TIME, Oct. 9, 1995, at 40, 42. Congress recently held
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Brimelow's figures, however, actually tell us little about the prospects for
the linguistic assimilation of post-1965 immigrants, much less about how the
new immigrants' progress compares to that of their predecessors. The reason
is that those figures fail to distinguish between the first and second
generations. Yet Americans hold the first generation to a much lower
assimilation standard than that to which they hold succeeding ones.
50
Brimelow overlooks the historical reality that first-generation immigrants
have always been slow to acquire good English proficiency. This phenomenon
is especially common if they arrived as adults, arrived recently, think that they
are likely to return, are refugees rather than economic or family migrants, had
little earlier exposure to English, had little schooling, or live in a minority-
language enclave.' The post-1965 immigrants exhibit some of these
variables more than earlier ones did, while exhibiting other variables less. Even
as to first-generation immigrants, however, English use appears to be quite
high.
152
It is the English fluency of the second generation-those born in the
United States or brought here as small children by foreign-born parents-that
is critical to immigrants' integration and to society's cultural coherence. A
recent analysis by Portes and Schauffler summarizes the historical pattern:
In the past, almost every first generation's loyalty to their ancestral
language has given way to an overwhelming preference for English
among their children....
[I]n no other country have foreign languages been
extinguished with such speed. In the past, the typical pattern has been
for the first generation to learn enough English to survive
economically; the second generation continued to speak the parental
tongue at home, but English in school, at work and in public life; by
hearings on English as the common language of the United States. House Holds Hearing on English as the
Common Language, 72 INTERPRETER RELEAsES 1542 (1995).
150. Alejandro Portes puts the point this way:
[F]irst-generation immigrants are not regarded generally as poor, no matter what their objective
situation is, because they are seen as somehow different from domestic minorities. The same
is not true of their children who as U.S. citizens and full participants in American society, are
unlikely to use a foreign country as a point of reference or as a place to return to. Instead, they
will be evaluated and will evaluate themselves by the standards of their new country.
Portes, supra note 103, at 15.
151. Chiswick & Miller, supra note 147, at 278-79. In another paper based on Australian data,
Chiswick and Miller show that "ethnic network" variables-particularly the existence of an ethnic press,
proximity of relatives, and spouse's origin language-are more important than the mere fact of living in
a minority-language enclave in explaining dominant-language fluency. Barry R. Chiswick & Paul V.
Miller, Ethnic Networks and Language Proficiency Among Immigrants (1995) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
152. In a 1995 survey, 81% of immigrants living in the United States for more than 20 years report
using "English at home most often"; for those in their first decade, the figure is 49%. See The Immigrant
Experience, supra note 68, at 103.
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the third generation, the home language shifted to English, which
effectively became the mother tongue for subsequent generations.
This pattern has held true for all immigrant groups in the past
with the exception of some isolated minorities.
151
Powerful evidence of the second generation's continued progress in
mastering English appears in Portes and Schauffler's recent empirical study of
English-language proficiency among eighth- and ninth-grade second-generation
students from many Caribbean, Latino, and Asian nationality groups in the
Miami area, which has a larger proportion of foreign-born residents than any
other American city. According to their data, gathered in 1992, fully 99% of
the students reported that they spoke, understood, read, and wrote English
"very well" or "well"; only 1% knew little or no English. 54 Time in the
United States and ethnic-enclave residency were the most important
independent variables; parental education and occupational and class status
were unimportant. Moreover, the children's preference for daily communication
in English over their parental language was overwhelming-even among recent
arrivals, and especially among those living in communities in which the
parental language was dominant. 55 The evidence on post-1965 immigrants'
English fluency, then, belies Brimelow's animadversions, at least as far as the
crucial second generation is concerned.
56
C. Illegitimacy
In contrast, his concern about the high illegitimacy rates among some
immigrant groups is amply warranted. He approvingly cites Michael Lind to
153. Alejandro Portes & Richard Schauffler, Language and the Second Generation: Bilingualism
Yesterday and Today, 28 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 640, 641, 643 (1994) (citing sources).
154. Id. at 647. The authors state that "self-reports of language ability, unlike other individual
characteristics, are both reliable and valid." Id. at 646 (citing sources).
155. Id. at 647, 652. Indeed, the authors note that because fluent bilingualism is increasingly an
economic asset, the loss of parental-language fluency may pose a greater risk for today's second generation
than the nonproblem of inadequate English. Id. at 659. This preference for English was even stronger
among Cuban children, who were educated in bilingual schools at the core of an ethnic enclave. Id. at 652.
Brimelow does cite (incorrectly, see ALIEN NATION, supra note I, at 306 n.4) a study of second-
generation schoolchildren in the San Diego and Miami areas that found that Mexican-American children,
including those who claimed to be proficient in English, nevertheless retained and preferred to speak the
parental language (Spanish) to a much greater degree than children from other nationality groups did. See
Ruben G. Rumbaut, The Crucible Within: Ethnic Identity, Self-Esteem, and Segmented Assimilation Among
Children ofImmigrants, 28 INT'L MIGRATION REv. 748, tbl. 3 at 768 (1994).
156. Despite the much higher Spanish preference rate of the Mexican-American children in the
Rumbaut study, they are not really an exception. Their English fluency was only slightly lower than some
foreign-language groups and was higher than several others, especially some Asian groups. Rumbaut, supra
note 155, tbl. 3 at 768. Spanish-language speakers, especially Mexicans, tend to have higher parental-
language retention rates, especially if they live near the border, interact with frequent border crossers, live
in a community constantly being replenished by first-generation Spanish-speaking immigrants, or adopt an
adversarial stance toward Anglo society. By the third generation, however, virtually everyone is
monolingual. See ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBtN G. RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA: A PORTRAIT 183
(1990).
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the effect that "Hispanic 'family values' are another immigration enthusiast's
myth-Mexican-American out-of-wedlock births, for example, are more than
twice the white rate, at 28.9 percent."'157 Other evidence suggests that
Mexican, Latin American, and Caribbean immigrant nonmarital fertility rates
are much higher than those for immigrants from Asia and Europe.5
If such rates accurately indicate the incidence of children growing up in
single-parent families, the rates would herald bleak life prospects for those
children and hence for the quality of American life more generally. To those
who would extenuate high alien illegitimacy on the ground that illegitimacy
among black Americans is far higher and illegitimacy among white Americans
is rising precipitously, Brimelow offers a compelling rejoinder: "[W]hat's the
point of immigrants who are no better than we are?"'59
Immigrants' cultural impact on American society, however, is a function
both of the values that they bring with them to the United States and of those
that they acquire here as they rub shoulders with Americans. Although
Brimelow focuses entirely on the former, the latter are probably more
important in the long run. Some evidence on what happens to immigrants'
behavior and values as they rub shoulders with Americans is profoundly
disturbing. Illegitimacy rates for some immigrant groups-for example,
Caribbean immigrants, who tend to live closest to inner-city native minority
populations with high illegitimacy rates-seem to increase the longer they are
in the United States. 60 According to a recent study by demographer Frank
Bean, '6  divorce rates, a subject that Brimelow fails to mention, reinforce
this pattern. The study indicates that Hispanics, most of whom are Mexicans,
exhibit lower divorce rates in their countries of origin than demographically
similar U.S. natives do. Divorce rates rise, however, among the second
generation here, and by the third generation, divorce rates are equal to those
of U.S. natives.
62
Recent research on second-generation immigrants suggests that these
examples may simply illustrate a more general dynamic of cultural transfer. In
157. ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 181.
158. Charles Hirschman, Problems and Prospects of Studying Immigrant Adaptation from the 1990
Population Census: From Generational Comparisons to the Process of "Becoming American," 28 INT'L
MIGRATION REV. 690, 708-10 (1994). The rates among Asian refugees, however, are much higher than
for other Asians. Id. at 710.
159. ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 184.
160. Hirschman, supra note 158, at 711.
161. See Frank D. Bean et al., Socioeconomic and Cultural Incorporation and Marital Disruption
Among Mexican Americans (Sept. 1995) (unpublished paper, on file with author).
162. Id. at 26-27. Frank Bean and his colleagues attribute the rise in divorce rates in the second and
third generations to the special uncertainties and vulnerabilities surrounding the immigration experience in
the United States that keep families together in the first generation. Id. at 25-26. Even in the third
generation, the Hispanic divorce rate does not exceed that of U.S. natives, whereas the black divorce rate
is higher than the U.S. average. Nevertheless, this dynamic could have worrisome implications for Mexican-
American progress in the United States. As the authors put it, "The greater marital stability of lower
socioeconomic status immigrants, when included in average rates of marital disruption, leads to what some
might term a falsely rosy picture." Id. at 26.
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this pattern, first- and second-generation immigrants, particularly second-
generation children, are inducted into American subcultures that transmit some
of that subculture's social pathologies to the newcomers. In this way,
dysfunctional behavior that is relatively rare in the country of origin may, with
exposure to that subculture, become more common among immigrant children
to mimic the American norm.
Some sociologists of immigration, notably Alejandro Portes, describe this
as a downward or "segmented" assimilation process. 63 Most new immigrants
locate in areas that bring their children disproportionately into close contact
with native minorities. Many of these natives, who may be the children and
grandchildren of immigrants unable to escape from the inner city, suffer from
prejudice, disadvantage, joblessness, and a variety of social pathologies that
foster a cluster of self-defeating attitudes and behaviors, including negative
views of education that contrast sharply with the optimism and socially
adaptive strategies that immigrants usually bring with them and seek to
transmit to their children. These natives, enraged and defeated by their blocked
mobility, can powerfully influence-and contaminate-the values of the new
immigrants' children, especially in the shared school environment. Portes
starkly depicts the problem:
The confrontation with the culture of the inner-city places second
generation youth in a forced-choice dilemma: to remain loyal to their
parents' outlook and mobility aspirations means to face social
ostracism and attacks in schools; to become "American" means often
to adopt the cultural outlook of the underclass and thus abandon any
upward mobility expectations based on individual achievement.
64
In this context, Portes says, the best option for today's first generation may be
to join dense immigrant communities where their children (the second
generation) can "capitaliz[e] on the moral and material resources that only
these communities can make available."' 65 There the children may gain the
breathing space and support they need to develop the skills that can move them
securely into the American mainstream. 66 But if they fail to develop these
skills, the children may succumb to the adversarial culture that surrounds, and
insidiously penetrates, the immigrant enclave and may turn for solace to a
163. See Alejandro Portes & Min Zhou, The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and
Its Variants, 530 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 74, 74 (1993).
164. Portes, supra note 103, at 17 (citations omitted).
165. Id. at 23.
166. Portes and Zhou have found empirical evidence for this form of self-consciously delayed
assimilation among the Cuban and Punjabi Sikh enclaves in South Florida and California, respectively,
contrasting the experiences of these groups to the less protected, downwardly assimilating Haitians in
Miami, and Mexicans and Mexican-Americans in central California. See Portes & Zhou, supra note 163,
at 87-91.
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negatively reconstituted ethnic culture that widens the differences between the
second generation and their native counterparts.
67
For our sake and the sake of the new immigrants, we must pray that they
can enable their children to resist these seductions. If the new immigrants
succeed in doing so, their children-like most (though not all) second
generations have in the past-will in all likelihood enter the mainstream of
American society, and Brimelow will have no cause for complaint. If the
children fail, however, their future-and ours-may be even bleaker than
Brimelow imagines. Although he does not discuss this possibility or the
second-generation problem more generally, his argument clearly implies that
the risk of failure is one that America can and should avoid either by
eliminating immigration altogether or by limiting it to groups that are already
so successful when they arrive that their children are relatively invulnerable to
the blandishments of underclass culture.
V. POLITICS
Brimelow believes that the post-1965 immigration is already sapping the
strength of the American political system. Some of his fears-for example,
irredentist movements by Mexican immigrants to reunite the Southwest with
Mexico and Mexican revanchism seeking to manipulate the continuing
allegiance of Mexican-Americans 6--are fatuous and even insulting in their
depiction of the latter as pawns whose disloyalty Mexico City could
successfully exploit. He warns that neither major party can count on being
helped electorally by immigration and that continuing our current pro-
immigration policies may spark a voter revolt that could strengthen an already
budding third-party movement. 69 The Democrats and Republicans, of course,
well understand this: Both the Clinton administration and the Republican
majority in Congress are supporting reforms that, while different in some
respects, would significantly restrict and restructure legal immigration.
17 0
167. See Bean et al., supra note 101, at 76-77. The Mexican-American experience in educational
attainment, furthermore, suggests that continued progress beyond the second generation is by no means
assured. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
168. See ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 193-95. For another discussion of this possibility, see LEON
BOUVIER, WHAT IF... ? IMMIGRATION DECISIONS: WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN, WHAT COULD BE 15
(1994).
169. See ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 195-201. As precedent, Brimelow points to the brief rise
of the Know-Nothings' American party in the 1850s. He emphasizes that the Know-Nothings, while rabidly
anti-Catholic, did not in fact seek to restrict immigration and placed a higher priority on abolition. Id. at
12-13, 200.
170. See Steven A. Holmes, House Panel Keeps Intact Bill to Restrict Immigration, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
12, 1995, at A20 (discussing Republican bill to restrict legal immigration); Robert Pear, Clinton Embraces
a Proposal to Cut Immigration by a Third, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1995, at B 10 (reporting President Clinton's
endorsement of proposal by Commission on Immigration Reform to reduce legal immigration by one-third).
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The political specter that haunts him most darkly, however, is
balkanization. 171  The fragmentation of nation-states, both real or
imagined, 72 into ethnic shards-a process observed in Lebanon, the former
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, many African states, and perhaps even
Canada-has become a leitmotif of the post-Cold War world. This unraveling
of political authority, often accompanied by massive human rights violations,
brutal warfare, economic immiseration, and suppression of political and
religious dissent, is an exceedingly dangerous development.
Could it happen here? Brimelow and many other Americans think so, and
they believe that post-1965 immigration has increased the odds. Brimelow cites
programs or cultural attitudes that create incentives for groups to exaggerate
their differences, and he denounces the "New Class," which, he claims, wants
to devolve the nation-state into ethnic tribes or to transcend the nation-state in
the name of universal human rights.
17 3
He mentions five specific policies that are effecting "the deconstruction of
the American nation as it existed in 1965.' ' " The first, of course, is the
policy of immigration itself.175 But how could the mere fact of immigration,
even racially heterogeneous immigration, threaten national unity? After all,
most of those who have chosen America presumably identify at least as
strongly with its ideals and institutions as those who just happened to be born
here. Especially in the first generation, many might continue to identify
strongly with their country or culture of origin, but that was also true of the
Germans, the Irish, the Jews, and even Brimelow's own group, the
English. 176 Brimelow does not show that the new immigrants are somehow
less patriotic than earlier ones or than native-born Americans are today. (Recall
that he himself is a recent immigrant swiftly transformed into a flag-waving
American). Indeed, new evidence suggests the contrary.
177
He mentions four other balkanizing policies: bilingualism, multiculturalism,
affirmative action, and a "systematic attack on the value of citizenship."'
178
Unfortunately, he fails to provide any clear definitions, useful distinctions, or
171. See ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 123-33.
172. The term "imagined" is taken, of course, from Benedict Anderson's coinage. See BENEDICT
ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (2d
ed. 1991).
173. See ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 230-32. Brimelow defines the "New Class" (a term he
explicitly borrows from Irving Kristol, see IRVING KRISTOL, TWO CHEERS FOR CAPITALISM 26-31 (1978))
as "the professionals who run and benefit from the state... and its power to tax." Id. at 230. For an
avowedly liberal critique of the balkanizing tendencies of contemporary society that rejects this distinction
between the "new class" and other powerful class interests, see LIND, supra note 13, at 327.
174. ALIEN NATION, supra note I, at 219.
175. Id.
176. Indeed, the fact that many of the new immigrants are refugees fleeing cruel regimes in harsh
societies, which Brimelow insists was not true in the good old days, id. at 246, suggests that the
newcomers' loyalties are, if anything, less conflicted than those of their predecessors.
177. See The Immigrant Experience, supra note 68, at 101 (relating 1995 survey data from June 1995
that indicate that immigrants' belief in American values is as great or greater than that of natives).
178. ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 219.
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other analysis for the genuinely thoughtful, open-minded reader. Nevertheless,
I believe that he is right to worry that these policies are weakening our
coherence as a polity 7 9 In seeking to use these policies to discredit
immigration, however, Brimelow poses a seductive but perniciously false
choice. Immigration may have encouraged the adoption of such policies, but
it does not require them; we can reject them and still have immigration. If they
are misguided policies, as in some respects they are, we can and should reform
or repeal them without holding immigration hostage. We must instead evaluate
immigration on its own merits. Brimelow might resist such a separation, of
course, arguing that immigration by groups other than white "Anglo-Saxons"
assures that the United States will maintain such policies, even if they prove
to be perverse. I have more confidence, however, in the responsiveness and
corrigibility of the American policymaking process. Recent reactions against
the more extreme versions of these misguided policies are already taking hold,
and I believe that my confidence will ultimately prove justified.
Bilingualism. I noted earlier that the crucial second generation of new
immigrants seems to be acquiring both competence in and a preference for
English, much as their predecessors did. t80 Still, it would be most imprudent
to ignore the danger signals raised by evidence suggesting that government-
sponsored bilingual education programs have subordinated pedagogical goals,
such as improving student performance in school by facilitating rapid English
fluency, to the ideological purpose of strengthening the child's identification
with her presumed ethnic culture.'' In my view, ethnic cultural retention is
a perfectly appropriate goal when pursued privately by parents and without
public aid or interference, but it has no place in the governmental agenda of
a society as pluralistic and liberal as ours. Most disturbing of all are recurring
indications that this deformation of bilingual education may actually retard the
English fluency, the educational progress, and hence the assimilation prospects
of already disadvantaged immigrant children.8 2 My present point, however,
179. Brimelow fails to mention another policy-racially defined and gerrymandered legislative
districting--that I believe is perhaps even more dangerous because it reinforces racialist thinking and
creates perverse incentives for political behavior, and because it is especially difficult to dislodge once it
is in place. See infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
181. For instances of this ideological subordination, see, for example, Stephanie Gutmann, The
Bilingual Ghetto: Why New York's Schools Won't Teach Immigrants English, CTY J., winter 1992, at 29;
Abigail M. Thernstrom, E Pluribus Plura-Congress and Bilingual Education, PUB. INTEREST, Summer
1980, at 3. I say "presumed" because of claims that assignment to bilingual classes sometimes reflects
nothing more than the school's ascription of ethnicity to the child based on her surname. For an example
of this practice, see Gutmann, supra, at 29.
182. See Toby L. Bovitz, Bilingual Education in New York No Longer Serves Students, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 1995, at A24 (letter to editor from bilingual psychologist in school system); Sam Dillon, Report
Faults Bilingual Education in New York, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 20, 1994, at Al; Gutmann, supra note 181, at
29; Jacques Steinberg, Lawsuit Is Filed Accusing State of Overuse of Bilingual Classes, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 1995, at B6 (reporting suit by parents' group). But see Maria Newman, Schools are Likely to Stop
Automatic English Testing, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 1996, at B3 (describing plan to terminate automatic testing
of children with Spanish surnames for possible placement in bilingual programs).
19971996]
HeinOnline -- 105 Yale L.J. 1997 1995-1996
The Yale Law Journal
is that we can and should reform bilingual education without abandoning
immigration.'83
Multiculturalism. Multiculturalism can take many forms, with vastly
different social consequences. A limited multicultural policy affirms the social
value of diverse cultural traditions and practices, protects individuals' and
groups' freedom to engage in them, and incorporates diversity values into
public school curricula, holidays, and national symbols. A more ambitious
multiculturalism goes beyond recognition and respect of such traditions to
define, preserve, and reinforce group differences through law.
The limited forms of multiculturalism are essential in a pluralistic
democracy in which ethnic pride can be personally enriching, group
strengthening, and socially integrative."84 These forms should not weaken
newcomers' ability or desire to achieve minimal levels of social assimilation,
or exacerbate inter-group conflict.185 Limited multiculturalism need not
degenerate into the intolerance, humorlessness, hypersensitivity, and bogus
essentialism that insists that group membership, rather than individual character
and personality, is our most defining and precious attribute.1
8 6
In criticizing more expansive policies of multiculturalism that deploy the
law to entrench and even construct group differences, Brimelow parrots an
already palpable and increasingly effective public impatience with their
excesses. 187 This impatience is salutary so long as it does not in turn breed
its own parochialism and intolerance. 188 In a vibrant democracy like ours,
policies such as multiculturalism tend to engender their own repudiation and
ultimate reversal precisely because enthusiasts push them beyond any sensible
limits.
183. Legislation pending in Congress would greatly restrict or even eliminate bilingual education. See,
e.g., H.R. 1005, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1995) (repealing former Bilingual Education Act, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 3281-3341 (1994)); see also Homblower, supra note 149, at 42 (detailing congressional and
administration positions on bilingual education). To the extent that these changes would eliminate even
genuinely transitional, short-term bilingual education entirely, they may go too far.
184. Canada, for example, has made multiculturalism a constitutionally-protected value. CAN. CONsT.
(Constitution Act, 1982), Pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 27 ("This Charter shall be
interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of
Canada."). The U.S. Supreme Court has also protected the right of religious and ethnic minorities to
preserve their cultural practices. E.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,
268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating Oregon law requiring children between ages of eight and 16 to attend
public school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down Nebraska statute prohibiting
teaching of languages other than English and instruction in languages other than English).
185. Glazer, supra note 60, at 46-47.
186. For a spirited attack on this "ideal of authenticity" and on the contrived character of many
multiculturalists' symbols, see LIND, supra note 13, at 122-27.
187. For alarming and sometimes tragi-comical examples by insightful observers, see RICHARD
BERNST IN, DICTATORSHIP OF VIRTUE: MULTICULTURALISM AND THE BATTLE FOR AMERICA'S FUTURE
(1994); LYNNE V. CHENEY, TELLING THE TRUTH: WHY OUR CULTURE AND OUR COUNTRY HAVE STOPPED
MAKING SENSE-AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT (1995).
188. See, e.g., MARY LEFKOWITz, NOT OUT OF AFRICA: How AFROCENTRISM BECAME AN EXCUSE
TO TEACH MYTH AS HISTORY (1996).
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Quite apart from the growing political opposition to perverse versions of
multiculturalism, some purely demographic considerations make rigid racial
division of the kind that Brimelow predicts most unlikely. First, the racial data
that Brimelow cites rely on self-ascriptions that are themselves remarkably
changeable over time and on highly arbitrary racial categories that grow less
and less meaningful over time. 8 9 This phenomenon is particularly true of
nonblack groups. Most Hispanics, the largest ethnic minority grouping, identify
themselves as white. 19° Furthermore, racial and ethnic boundaries blur as
people of different groups marry. Exogamy, already high between some groups
in the United States, has been increasing for all. Black-white marriage rates
(the smallest exogamy category) more than quintupled between 1968 and 1988,
rising from only 1.6% of all marriages involving an African-American to 8.9%.
Exogamy between blacks and other groups and between whites and other
groups has also been increasing.' 9' Exogamy between American-born Asian
women and non-Asian men is strikingly high, reaching 41.7% in 1990.19'
The conventional demographic projections that Brimelow uses do not
account for these remarkable (and in my view, highly desirable) trends, which
seem likely to continue or even accelerate in the future. 93 Such analyses
assume that "exogamy is nonexistent by assuming single ancestry offspring,
usually taking the father's racial status as the marker."'194 A recent analysis
that does seek to take exogamy (but not the other sources of shifting racial
identities) into account shows that doing so can make an enormous difference
in racial composition projections. 95 The study simulated future racial
composition by factoring differential exogamy rates into the analysis and
projecting the effect of those rates over multiple generations. If all mixed
189. See, e.g., LIND, supra note 13, at 118-37; MARY C. WATERS, ETHNIC OPTIONS: CHOOSING
IDENTITIES IN AMERICA 16-51 (1990); Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of
"Race" in Race-Conscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1239-40 (1994).
190. The percentage of white-identifying Hispanics depends in part on the structure of the survey
instrument and the methodology of the questioner. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P23-182, EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE RACE-ETHNIC COMPARISON
GROUPS IN CURRENT POPULATION SURVEYS 2-3 (1992). For an historical survey of the changing racial
and ethnic questions in the census, including the mutability of Hispanic self-identification, see Stephan
Themstrom, American Ethnic Statistics, in IMMIGRANTS IN Two DEMOCRACIES: FRENCH AND AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE 80, 100 n.5 (Donald L. Horowitz & G6rard Noiriel eds., 1992) (reporting that 21.1% of people
who identified with Spanish-origin group in 1971 gave different origin just one year later; 12% of all those
who self-identified as Hispanic had abandoned it).
191. For these exogamy data, see Frank D. Bean et al., The Changing Demography of U.S.
Immigration Flows: Patterns, Projections, and Contexts 13 (July 1995) (unpublished paper presented at
Conference on German-American Migration and Refugee Policies, on file with author).
192. See id. tbl. 4.
193. In a curious, brief discussion of interracial marriage, he acknowledges that it would tend to
dissipate the Pincers' pressure and then adds the following "BUT' (italics and capitalization in original):
"while more Hispanics are intermarrying, the proportion of all Hispanic marriages has fallen, swamped by
the sheer growth of the Hispanic population." ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 274. The meaning and
relevance of this observation escape me.
194. Bean et al., supra note 191, at 14.
195. See Barry Edmonston et al., Ethnicity, Ancestry, and Exogamy in U.S. Population Projections
(Apr. 1994) (unpublished paper presented before Population Association of America, on file with author).
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ancestry persons were classified as single ancestry and self-identified as white,
the number of non-Hispanic whites could be 31 million people (nearly 15%)
larger than under the conventional census projection by the year 2040.196
My point is not that whites therefore have less to fear from demographic
change. Rather, the very meaning of the traditional racial categories that
structure such fears is rapidly becoming obsolete. Social attitudes and choices
are evidently catching up to this demographic reality. Static, rigid, self-
perpetuating policies of affirmative action and multiculturalism, premised on
these obsolete meanings and categories, are already proving to be reactionary,
not liberating.
To return to the larger point: Militant, mindless multiculturalism can be a
destructive ideology that one should oppose on a variety of empirical and
normative grounds. Immigration, even the post-1965 immigration, does not
require such folly. Policies calculated to foster, or at least not impede,
immigrants' assimilation to the dominant American culture without suppressing
their ethnic ties continue to be the best antidote to balkanizing pressures.
97
Affirmative Action. Brimelow complains that, as the demographic pincers
close, affirmative action will place Alexander, his white son, at even more of
a disadvantage than the poor lad labors under today. But like multiculturalism,
race-based affirmative action-at least in its strongest, nonprocessual forms-is
a policy with a doubtful political future. The Clinton administration, for
example, has not fought very hard for it. 98 But if affirmative action is
plainly on the defensive in Congress, the courts, and public opinion, it also
enjoys the political advantage of any long-standing, institutionalized
program.1
99
196. See Bean et al., supra note 191, at 14-15 (summarizing findings in Edmonston et al., supra note
195, at 28). The actual number would depend on how such individuals self-identify in reporting to the
census. This in turn may depend on how the Census Bureau resolves the issue of whether a mixed ancestry
category should be established. On the Census Bureau's approach to this question, see Lawrence Wright,
One Drop of Blood, NEW YORKER, July 25, 1994, at 46.
197. For two discussions of this question, see FORD FOUND., CHANGING RELATIONS: NEWCOMERS AND
ESTABLISHED RESIDENTS IN U.S. COMMUNITIES (1993); OPENING THE DOOR, supra note 55. The first of
these would change the focus from immigrants' assimilation to their accommodation, defined as "a process
by which all sides in a multifaceted situation, including established residents and groups at different stages
of settlement, find ways of adjusting to and supporting one another." FORD FOUND., supra, at 4. To the
extent that this change is an exhortation to receiving communities to welcome immigrants, it is benign, but
to the extent that it is meant to shift the initiative for, and the principal burdens of, assimilation from
immigrants to the established community, it is probably misguided and will engender resistance.
198. See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, Pentagon Move to Hurt Minority Builders, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1995,
at B2 (reporting that Defense Department, Small Business Administration, and other agencies are curtailing
affirmative action programs); Steven A. Holmes, White House to Suspend a Program for Minorities, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 1996, at Al (ordering three-year suspension of minority and female set-aside programs for
contracts).
199. The struggle to limit affirmative action will be extended and will proceed differently in different
policy domains. See, e.g., B. Drummond Ayres Jr., Efforts to End Job Preferences Are Faltering, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 1995, at Al. My criticisms of affirmative action do not refer to policies that require
employers, universities, and other entities to engage in more broad-ranging recruitment processes, which
I strongly support. These policies are not seriously in question. Rather, I am concerned with policies that
either require, or as a practical matter demand, quotas or preferences based on race.
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Brimelow neither defines affirmative action nor engages in a detailed
analysis of it, but he is clear that the post-1965 immigration renders it even
more problematic than it would otherwise be. I emphatically agree. 200 Until
the recent assault on affirmative action in Congress and the Supreme Court, the
policy steadily expanded from the protection of blacks in the employment
setting to the protection of new groups in new contexts. The new groups
include immigrants who happen to possess the protected demographic
characteristics, such as race, even though they did not personally suffer the
historical discrimination that prompted affirmative action's solicitude for
American blacks or descend from those who did. In my view, this policy is
impossible to justify, even if one is not the father of a white child, and
especially if one is the father of a black one.
This Review is not the place to analyze the merits and demerits of
affirmative action in particular domains or in general. 20' Only affirmative
action's connections to the post-1965 immigration concern me here.
Affirmative action has benefited the post-1965 immigrants in at least two
senses. First, affirmative action programs now confer protected status on the
millions of immigrants who happen to be members of currently favored
groups. Second, the rhetoric of affirmative action was used to legitimate and
augment the power of ethnic interest group politics, spawning a program of so-
called "diversity" admissions-wholly unwarranted, in my view2 -that adds
200. See Peter H. Schuck, The New Immigration and the Old Civil Rights, AM. PROSPECT, Fall 1993,
at 102, 108-11.
201. No one can gauge precisely the overall social effects of race-based affirmative action on its
supposed beneficiaries. There are, however, reasons to believe that the net effects are either inconsequential
or negative. For example, Thomas Sowell, who has written extensively on affirmative action both in the
United States and abroad, has compared the pre- and postaffirmative action periods and found that black
employment gains were actually greater during the earlier period. THOMAS SOWELL, PREFERENTIAL
POLICIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 113, 115 (1990). In a recent study comparing protected
minorities' employment patterns in private firms that adopted either "identity-conscious" (making race
relevant) or "identity-blind" (merit-based) personnel decisions, the authors (both strong affirmative action
proponents) found that by most measures, improvement in the groups' employment status was not affected
by identity-conscious interventions. Alison M. Konrad & Frank Linnehan, Formalized HRM Structures:
Coordinating Equal Employment Opportunity Or Concealing Organizational Practices?, 38 ACAD. MGMT.
J. 787 (1995).
On the negative side, members of protected groups whose genuine, hard-won achievements on the
job and in universities are unfairly depreciated because of the supposed favoritism ascribed to affirmative
action have suffered much personal indignity, reputational harm, and psychic injury as a result. The social
damage to relations between the races has been incalculably great, in my view. According to a recent study,
white opposition to affirmative action now encompasses the liberal core of the Democratic party; it is just
as strong among those most committed to racial equality as among those least committed to such values.
See Martin Gilens et al., Affirmative Action and the Politics of Realignment 3-4 (Apr. 1995) (unpublished
conference paper prepared for annual meeting of Midwest Political Science Association, on file with
author). One fervently hopes that this damage is not irreversible.
202. The beneficiaries of this program, after all, come from countries that were unfairly favored by
the pre-1965 immigration policy. For a general critique of diversity programs, including this one, see
Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Equality and Diversity, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 319, 330-35
(1993).
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55,000 visas each year for immigrants from countries whose nationals
supposedly have been disadvantaged by the 1965 law.2 3
In contrast, the racially diverse post-1965 immigration has been decidedly
bad for affirmative action. I predict that recent immigration, far from serving
as a firm buttress for future affirmative action policies as Brimelow believes,
will eventually contribute to their demise. Immigration has undermined race-
based affirmative action programs by revealing and then magnifying the moral,
political, and empirical weaknesses of some of their underpinnings.2" First,
immigration enlarges the beneficiary pool to include immigrants who, unlike
American blacks, cannot claim that they themselves have suffered historically-
rooted discrimination here, but who nevertheless are entitled by affirmative
action programs to compete with Americans for program benefits. This
phenomenon not only dilutes the programs' benefits (such as they are) but also
undermines their moral integrity.
Second, the group-based nature of the claims that affirmative action
programs endorse inevitably invites attention to the fact that some immigrant
groups, including some that arrived after 1965, endured harsh discrimination
based on religion, language, class, and race, yet have managed to achieve
greater economic and social progress than have many American blacks. 5
This record of achievement is bound to weaken the claim of many traditional
civil rights activists that policies such as affirmative action are essential to
individual and group progress. Third, immigration renders transparent the
illogic, even absurdity, of the racial classifications and methodologies on which
the integrity of such programs ultimately rests.206 Finally, as Brimelow points
out, the growth of "new minorities, each with their own grievances and
attitudes-quite possibly including a lack of guilt about, and even hostility
toward, blacks"-casts an ominous shadow over the long-term political
203. Many of these countries, of course, were advantaged by the pre-1965 law. In fact, the chief
beneficiaries of this program, as was intended at the time of enactment, are the Irish, for whom 41% of the
diversity visas were reserved during 1992-94. See Schuck, supra note 96, at 71-72.
204. See Schuck, supra note 200, at 108-11 (noting invidious group comparisons invited by race-based
affirmative action, and favoring class-based remedies instead); see also Richard D. Kahlenberg, Equal
Opportunity Critics, NEw REPUBLIC, July 17 & 24, 1995, at 20 (noting that some opponents of race-based
affirmative action are beginning to embrace class-based preferences). Class-based affirmative action also
has its critics, see, e.g., Michael Kinsley, The Spoils of Victimhood, NEW YORKER, Mar. 27, 1995, at 62,
65-66, and would be difficult to implement, see, e.g., Sarah Kershaw, California's Universities Confront
New Diversity Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1996, at A10 (discussing problems in applying class-based
criteria).
205. See NATHAN GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY
168-205 (1975); Nathan Glazer, Immigrants and Education, in CLAMOR AT THE GATES: THE NEW
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 213 (Nathan Glazer ed., 1985) [hereinafter CLAMOR AT THE GATES]; Ivan Light,
Immigrant Entrepreneurs in America: Koreans in Los Angeles, in CLAMOR AT THE GATES, supra, at 161;
Peter I. Rose, Asian Americans: From Pariahs to Paragons, in CLAMOR AT THE GATES, supra, at 181;
Schuck, supra note 200, at 107. For a microscopic view of these invidious comparisons as they operate in
the workplace, see generally WATERS, supra note 118.
206. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 189, at 1234 ("However analytically 'soft' a particular classification
may be, making it a centerpiece of government resource-allocation will require that it be 'hardened'
dramatically."); Wright, supra note 196, at 46.
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prospects of affirmative action and its capacity to promote interracial
reconciliation. 20 7
Brimelow unaccountably ignores another realm, voting rights, in which
immigration erodes the coherence of affirmative action. Under the Voting
Rights Act of 1965,2"8 the U.S. Department of Justice, with the acquiescence
of Congress and the federal courts, has frequently insisted that legislative
district boundaries be drawn to maximize the number of seats safely controlled
by representatives of racial minorities. Many legal scholars and political
scientists question the wisdom, legality, and representational efficacy of this
practice,20 9 and some political commentators blame it for many of the
devastating Democratic losses in the 1994 congressional elections.2 t0 The
Supreme Court recently subjected the Justice Department's policy to
heightened constitutional scrutiny.21'
The post-1965 immigration renders affirmative action districting of this
kind even more problematic. By multiplying the number of residentially
concentrated ethnic groups that can assert claims to a limited number of safe
legislative seats, immigration has intensified intergroup conflict and made
negotiated solutions to these inevitably bitter disputes much more difficult.
While Asian-origin voters are unlikely in the near future to achieve the
numbers and concentrations needed to qualify for this form of relief, Hispanic-
Americans, whose numbers are increasing more rapidly than the black
population, have already crossed that threshold in a number of jurisdictions and
will soon do so in others.2 2
The flaw in Brimelow's logic should now be clear. Whatever one's
evaluation of the merits of race-based affirmative action programs and
207. ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 65 (emphasis omitted). This possibility seems especially great
among Asian-Americans, who tend to be more conservative politically than African-Americans.
208. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973p (1988 & Supp. 1993).
209. See, e.g., LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 41-70 (1994); CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS: THE
REPRESENTATION OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CONGRESS, at vii-ix, 193-225 (1993); ABIGAIL
THERNSTROM, VHOSE VOTES COUNT?: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS (1987);
James F. Blumstein, Racial Gerrymandering and Vote Dilution: Shaw v. Reno in Doctrinal Context, 26
RUTGERS LJ. 517 (1995); Schuck, supra note 200, at 105-11; Peter H. Schuck, What Went Wrong with
the Voting Rights Act, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 1987, at 51. Other scholars have enthusiastically endorsed
it. See, e.g., BERNARD GROFMAN Er AL, MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING
EQUALITY 131-37 (1992); Luis R. Fraga, Latino Political Incorporation and the Voting Rights Act, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 278 (Bernard Grofman
& Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) [hereinafter CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING]; Pamela S. Karlan,
The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1737-40 (1993); Allan J.
Lichtman, Redistricting, in Black and White, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1994, at A23.
210. See, e.g., Juan Williams, Blacked Out in the Newt Congress: The Black Caucus Regroups as
Jesse Mulls a Third Party Bid, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1994, at Cl.
211. The leading cases are Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993), and Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct.
2475 (1995).
212. See Hugh Davis Graham, Voting Rights and the American Regulatory State, in CONTROVERSIES
IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 209, at 177, 195-96. On growing Asian-American political activism, see
Steven A. Holmes, Anti-Immigrant Mood Moves Asians to Organize, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1996, at Al.
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whatever the bearing of immigration on those programs, they can and should
be considered separately from the issue of immigration policy. We can choose
to have immigration without choosing the kind of affirmative action that
discredits immigration by association.
Citizenship. Part of "the deconstruction of the American nation" that
Brimelow laments results from a "[s]ystematic attack on the value of
citizenship, by making it easier for aliens to vote, receive government
subsidies, etc."2 3 The content of "etc." appears in his call, inter alia, for
fundamental changes in our approach to citizenship. They include a new
Americanization campaign modeled on the programs of the first two decades
of this century, an English-language requirement for new immigrants and
stricter enforcement of the existing English requirement for naturalized
citizens, constitutional amendments eliminating birthright citizenship for the
native-born children of illegal aliens and prescribing English as our official
language, and possibly the lengthening of the residency period for
naturalization to as long as the fourteen years required under the Alien and
Sedition Act of 1798 and repealed in 1801.24
Brimelow presents these ideas in a manner that treats them more as
rallying points and political slogans than as serious, thoughtful proposals for
change. He shows no interest in analyzing the evidence bearing on them, the
substantial objections that might be made to them, or the features that might
be necessary to make them politically palatable or practically implementable.
He simply presents items on his laundry list.
Brimelow's ipse dixits will therefore be of little value to policymakers.
Nevertheless, some of the items on his list do deserve serious consideration;
indeed, some are already receiving it. An example is the issue of birthright
citizenship for illegal alien children, which is now under active discussion in
Congress. t5 Political scientist Rogers Smith and I coauthored a book
analyzing this very question. We argued that the Citizenship Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,2 t6 properly interpreted, permits Congress to regulate
or even eliminate birthright citizenship for such children if it wishes. 2'7 We
noted that whether Congress should prospectively eliminate birthright
citizenship, and, if so, how to go about it, entail genuinely difficult normative,
218empirical, and policy questions. We expressed a particular concern (shared
213. ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 219 (emphasis omitted). The key, he writes, is "[a]voiding the
Romans' mistake of diluting their citizenship into insignificance." Id. at 267.
214. Id. at 264--67.
215. See Schuck Testimony, supra note 3; Supplemental Letter, supra note 3; see also Neil A. Lewis,
Bill Seeks to End Automatic Citizenship for All Born in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1995, at A26.
216. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
217. PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN
THE AMERICAN POLITY 5, 72-89 (1985); see also Peter H. Schuck, Membership in the Liberal Polity: The
Devaluation of American Citizenship, 3 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. I (arguing that birthright citizenship and
minimal incentives for aliens to naturalize have lowered value of U.S. citizenship).
218. SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 217, at 90-115.
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by our critics 219) that such a policy change risks creating a destitute, highly
vulnerable, more or less permanent caste of pariah children who, due to
ineffective INS border and interior enforcement, might remain in that condition
for the rest of their lives in the United States.220 We proposed strategies to
avert this grim possibility, including an amnesty for many then-illegal
aliens. 221 Nevertheless, this concern remains deeply troubling, especially
today when the number of illegal alien residents in the United States may
exceed four million and a new amnesty is politically inconceivable. The ever-
insouciant Brimelow, however, appears not to have even considered the
extremely difficult problems that this situation creates.
His proposal for an "official English" amendment is an even more telling
example of his aversion to analysis. Because a similar policy has already been
adopted in twenty-two states,2 2 some evidence about how it actually works
already exists. Brimelow fails to cite this evidence, which indicates that the
policy has had no practical effect--except, perhaps, to convince many
Hispanic-Americans, who already have overwhelming incentives to acquire
English fluency, that they are unwelcome in their new country.
22
A new "Americanization" program-if designed to foster immigrants'
social and linguistic integration without the paternalism, cultural intolerance,
and outright racism that tainted many of the early twentieth century
campaigns 224 -might well be desirable. At a minimum, such an effort should
significantly augment the woefully inadequate public resources now available
for teaching English to adult immigrants.22 The government should also
219. The most probing criticisms-although not persuasive in our view-are found in GERALD L.
NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW
(forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 473-535, on file with author); David A. Martin, Membership and
Consent: Abstract or Organic?, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 278 (1985). But see Peter H. Schuck & Rogers M.
Smith, Membership and Consent: Actual or Mythic? A Reply to David A. Martin, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 545
(1986).
220. See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 217, at 97-100, 136-37.
221. Id. at 99, 135. Our book was published well before Congress enacted such an amnesty in the
1986 IRCA legislation. We recommended such a measure in the book.
222. See discussion supra note 149 and accompanying text; see also Montana Law on English, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 3, 1995, at B8 (describing law that makes English official language of state government). But
see Court Strikes Language Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1994, at A18 (relating decision of Ninth Circuit that
invalidated on First Amendment grounds amendment to Arizona Constitution requiring state employees to
speak only English on job).
223. See Jack Citrin, Language Politics and American Identity, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1990, at 96,
108 ("The instrumental consequences of state and local 'official English' legislation are virtually nil, and
in the absence of a genuine threat to the status of English, the formal subordination of other languages is
mainly divisive.").
224. For a description of the Americanization movements of the first two decades of the twentieth
century, see Philip Gleason, American Identity and Americanization, in HARVARD ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra
note 82, at 31, 39-41, 57-58 (entry and bibliographic sources).
225. Such classes are chronically over-subscribed, and the waiting lists are long. David Leanhardt,
Immigrants' Hopes Converge on English Class: Eager to Break Language Barrier Would-Be Students
Overwhelm Programs for Adults, WASH. POST, July 25, 1994, at B I; Deborah Sontag, English as a
Precious Language: Immigrants Hungry for Literacy Find That Classes Are Few, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29,
1993, at 29.
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abandon its traditional passivity with respect to naturalization and instead
emphasize its benefits to immigrants.226 Again, however, Brimelow does not
trouble to explore seriously the programmatic content of an Americanization
policy.
227
In truth, his discussion of citizenship is really a diversionary tactic. His
real agenda is something he portentously calls "the National Question. 228 He
wishes to affirm his belief in a distinctive American nation-state in contrast to
the one-worlders who, out of misguided guilt or bland cosmopolitanism, would
dismantle our borders and throw open our doors to all comers-the more the
merrier, the poorer the better.
This target, of course, is a straw man. There are indeed a smattering of
academics, ethnic advocates, immigration lawyers, and militant multiculturalists
who, if judged by their rhetoric, seem to fit this description. 229 But, as
Brimelow surely knows, they are outliers-no more representative of
immigration enthusiasts than Brimelow is of restrictionists. (I know of no
restrictionist in Congress, for example, who proposes to go to zero
immigration, as Brimelow seems to do.23) Americans vigorously disagree
about precisely what Americanism consists of. They always have;231
presumably they always will. Our core political identity is more elusive than
that of, say, Japan, Germany, or Sweden-nation-states whose ethnic
226. The current INS administration is already instituting such a change, with some success. Its timing
could hardly be better. For reasons having little to do with the INS's new effort and much to do with the
threat to legal immigrants' public benefits posed by pending legislation and an imminent change in
Mexico's own citizenship law, see Sam Dillon, Mexico Woos U.S. Mexicans, Proposing Dual Nationality,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1995, § 1, at 16 (discussing proposed Mexican constitutional amendment that would
permit Mexicans living in United States to retain Mexican nationality upon becoming U.S. citizens), a
stunning increase in the number of naturalization petitions is now occurring. See, e.g., Louis Freedberg,
Citizenship Wave Surprises INS: Applications Pour in as Immigrants Act to Protect Benefits, S.F. CHRON.,
Apr. 13, 1995, at Al, A23 (detailing increase in naturalization petitions in INS's San Francisco district and
in United States). The total for 1995 will probably exceed one million.
One presumes that Brimelow opposes this development, since he thinks that naturalization should be
a far more protracted process and therefore applauds the Know-Nothings' battle cry: "Nationalize, then
naturalize." ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 12-13, 265. I believe that the current five-year minimum
period, which is already longer than those in a number of immigrant nations, has served us well. In any
event, most naturalizing immigrants take longer than five years. See 1994 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK,
supra note 29, tbl. K at 128.
227. For a recent, thoughtful exploration of some normative issues concerning citizenship, see the
papers on that subject in Symposium, Immigration Law and the New Century: The Developing Regime, 35
VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1994).
228. See ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 232, 264-67.
229. For scholars advocating open borders, or at least a strong presumption in favor of them, see, for
example, BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 89-95 (1980); Joseph H. Carens,
Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REv. POL 251 (1987); R. George Wright, Federal
Immigration Law and the Case for Open Entry, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1265 (1994).
230. Even the group Negative Population Growth, which is radical enough to want to reduce the U.S.
population to 125-150 million (about half its present size), proposes legal immigration of up to 100,000
per year. See advertisement in NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 23, 1995, after 37. But see LIND, supra note 13, at
206-07 (discussing proposals for increased immigration).
231. See Gleason, supra note 224, at 39-41.
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solidarities have powerfully shaped their self-understandings.232 But while
Americans struggle over the contemporary meaning of Americanism, 33 only
a handful would deny that the United States is a distinctive polity that must
protect its national sovereignty, nourish its culture, choose among its potential
immigrants, and thus turn many away from its shores.
CONCLUSION
Brimelow claims that American society has fallen into crisis since the new
immigrants arrived and that they are responsible for its decline. I have sought
to demonstrate that most of his factual claims are either wrong or fail to justify
his radical policy prescriptions. For those whom I have not yet convinced, I
wish to use this concluding section to test his overarching claim-that the
post-1965 immigration flow has been an unequivocal plague on American
society. I propose to do so by offering a (necessarily incomplete) answer to the
following question: How does the state of American society today compare to
its state in 1965, when the new immigrants began coming and when the Fall
(according to Brimelow) therefore began? Briefly stated, my answer is that we
are in most important respects a far better society than we were before these
immigrants arrived. Their contribution to this progress is striking in the growth
of the economy, the expansion of civil rights and social tolerance, and the
revitalization of many urban neighborhoods. Moreover, these immigrants bear
little blame for the great exception to this progress: the increase in the social
pathology afflicting some inner-city subcultures.2 4 Just as Brimelow cannot
prove that the post-1965 immigrants caused certain social conditions in
America to be worse than they would otherwise have been, it would be
impossible for me to show how much of our post-1965 progress they caused.
The evidence strongly suggests, however, that the post-1965 immigrants
contributed to it.
Brimelow's answer to the question, of course, is very different. To him,
the America of 1965 was an Edenic paradise compared to
today' 5-relatively crime-free, economically prosperous, normatively
coherent, politically stable, linguistically unified, demographically stable, and
ecologically sustainable. Most important, it was overwhelmingly white. By
1995, the newcomers had changed all that, bringing us a society marked by
drugs, violent crime, economic decline, debased family life, a babel of
232. For an interesting effort by one immigrant to define Americanism, see TED MORGAN, ON
BECOMING AMERICAN (1978).
233. For one such effort that strongly eschews "Anglo-centrie" conceptions of the American nation
(such as Brimelow's), see LIND, supra note 13, at 352-88.
234. I say "little," not none. Aliens' drug-related crime, see supra notes 127-46 and accompanying
text, is the principal exception.
235. He tells us that he and his brother "gave it an A+." ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 221.
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languages, clashing value systems, racial conflict, political divisions, a
population bomb, a crowded, degraded environment-and swarthy
complexions. No wonder Brimelow anguishes about America's present and
about his son Alexander's future! 6
Brimelow's depressing, hand-wringing account of today's America,
although common enough among conservatives and liberals alike, is
profoundly distorted. It is true that the new immigration coincided with some
extremely negative developments in American life. The most important of
these is the erosion of family structure, which has blighted the lives of an
immense number of children born out-of-wedlock and raised in single- or no-
parent households237 by caretakers who depend on public assistance and who
are often only children themselves. Most of what is most pernicious about
American society today-its high levels of street crime, drug use, racial fears,
domestic violence, welfare dependency, public health menaces such as AIDS,
educational failure, and high unemployment among low-skill youth-derives
from this fundamental pathology of family structure. There is no gainsaying
its deeply corrosive effects on American life.
It is also true, however, that little of this pathology can be attributed to the
new immigrants. To be sure, many of them commit drug-related crimes; some
sub-groups, mainly Asian refugees, have relatively high welfare rates; and
some others, notably Mexican-Americans, have high illegitimacy rates. These
behaviors are indeed troubling, as is the fact that they seem to increase the
more that the new immigrants interact with Americans. 238 Still, these grim
patterns must be kept in perspective: Relatively few of the new immigrants
commit crimes, and the vast majority of these are drug-related; we are not
supposed to select refugees for their skills; and the groups with high
illegitimacy rates are comprised disproportionately of illegal aliens, many of
whom can be excluded in the future by better border control policies.
What about the other side of the ledger, which Brimelow assiduously
ignores? If the post-1965 immigrants have contributed to some of America's
failures, have they not also contributed to some of our post-1965 successes?
If so, do not these successes contradict Brimelow's alarums about the state of
the American polity?
236. He says that "we still give it an A+" but then adds "what's left of it." Id. By this qualification
he presumably means the part that the new immigrants have not yet destroyed.
237. A March 1995 Census Bureau report indicates that 30.8% of families with children were headed
by a single parent in 1994; the corresponding rate was 13% in 1970. Of the 11.5 million such families, the
vast majority-9.9 million-were headed by women. 2-Parent Families Increasing in U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 17, 1995, at A17.
238. See supra notes 160-67 and accompanying text. Other American (mis)behaviors also seem to rub
off on immigrants. For example, the prostate cancer rate among Japanese men increases markedly when
they immigrate to the United States, apparently because of their change to a high-fat diet here. The prostate
cancer rate per 100,000 increased from eight for men in Japan to 30 for first-generation Japanese
immigrants in Los Angeles and to 34 for second-generation immigrants; among white men in Los Angeles
it is 66. Jane Brody, Low-Fat Diet in Mice Slows Prostate Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1995, at C13.
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The truth is that the last three decades have witnessed some remarkable
advances in American life. While causality in such matters is extremely
complex and elusive, the new immigrants can claim some credit for many of
these advances. Most plausibly, they have contributed to our continued if slow
economic growth,2 9 the dramatic rise in the public's tolerance for minorities
(including dark-skinned aliens) and its support for racial integration and
equality,240  the renaissance in many previously declining urban
neighborhoods, 24' and the diversification and enrichment of many aspects of
American culture. Beyond these advances, however, are social improvements
that bespeak a robust polity, one that contradicts Brimelow's vision of political
dissolution and decline attributable to the new immigrants.242 1 shall mention
only three areas of improvement: the environment, politics, and the quality of
life.
Environment. Brimelow blames the new immigrants for the deterioration
of the American environment.243 In fact, however, the quality of the
American environment today is vastly superior to its state in 1965, before these
immigrants arrived. Whether the concern is air pollution (indoor or outdoor),
water quality, deforestation, pesticides and other chemical risks, radiation
hazards, food quality, land preservation, historic preservation, wetlands,
farmland, energy efficiency, toxic waste, depletion of raw materials, lead paint,
acid rain, or many other conditions, the levels of risk and environmental
degradation today are lower, often much lower, than they were in 1965.24
These improvements rank as one of the greatest triumphs of private
mobilization and public policy in our history. Insofar as immigrants contributed
to the economic growth that made these policies fiscally and hence politically
sustainable, they helped to improve the environment. At the very least, they
did not prevent such gains from being realized.
Politics. In 1965, blacks and other disadvantaged minorities played at best
a marginal role in the American political system. For almost a century, they
had been routinely denied the vote guaranteed to them by the Fifteenth
Amendment, and there were relatively few racial minority officeholders. There
were also few female officeholders, although women had received the
239. The per capita gross national product increased almost 60% in constant dollars between 1965 and
1993; per capita disposable income increased almost 75% during the same period. 1994 U.S. STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT, supra note 55, tbl. 691.
240. See sources cited supra note 17.
241. See, e.g., MULLER, supra note 120, at 151-60; LOUIS WINNICK, NEW PEOPLE IN OLD
NEIGHBORHOODS: THE ROLE OF NEW IMMIGRANTS IN REJUVENATING NEW YORK'S COMMUNITIES (1990).
242. Brimelow's narrative of decline is commonplace today. It is also told by some who would
probably agree with him on little else. See, e.g., CHARLES A. REICH, OPPOSING THE SYSTEM (1995).
243. ALIEN NATION, supra note 1, at 187-90.
244. For a detailed discussion of these changes, see generally GREGG EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT ON
THE EARTH: THE COMING AGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL OPTIMISM (1995); AARON WILDAVSKY, BUT IS IT
TRUE? A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES (1995); THE TRUE STATE
OF THE PLANET: TEN OF THE WORLD'S PREMIER ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCHERS IN A MAJOR CHALLENGE
TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT (Ronald Bailey ed., 1995).
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franchise almost a half-century earlier. Three decades later, blacks, Asians,
Hispanics, women, the disabled, elderly, gays and lesbians, and other
minorities are full participants in the political system at all levels of
government. Their organizations have led largely successful struggles to enact
a plethora of laws-the Voting Rights Act of 1965,245 the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,246 the Age Discrimination Act
of 1975,247 the Education of the Handicapped Act of 1975,248 the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,49 the Civil Rights Act of
1991,250 and many others-designed to prevent discrimination and otherwise
advance their group interests.
As a result of these developments, the American political system today is
far more participatory and responsive to minority interests than it was in
1965." t If the level of party discipline in both major parties in Congress is
any measure of coherence, American politics today is also more coherent and
less fragmented than it has been for decades.' 2 This partisanship reflects and
reinforces a growing ideological polarization between the parties that tends to
sharpen policy issues, widen voters' choices, and increase accountability. The
bellicosity of partisan politics today is part of the price that we pay for these
virtues, and it is well worth it.
Taken together, these changes have transformed the American state into
a more robust democracy than ever before. They have helped to shape a polity
that is far more just and responsive to far more people than it was before the
new immigrants came.
Quality of Life. I have already noted the enormous economic growth that
has occurred since 1965, growth that translates into higher disposable income
and living standards for virtually all Americans. 25 It is important to
emphasize that even the millions still mired in poverty-a group that,
according to the best, consumption-based estimates, is less than half the
percentage of the population that it was in 1961-enjoy an improved standard
of living. 4 With the enactment and extraordinary expansion of the Food
245. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973 p (1988 & Supp. 1993).
246. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
247. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1988).
248. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1994).
249. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 1993).
250. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 107 (codified at scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
251. Indeed, one can argue that it is too responsive to special interests of all kinds and insufficiently
deliberative.
252. See Adam Clymer, With Political Discipline, It Works Like Parliament, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,
1995, § 4, at 6 (analyzing high level of party discipline among congressional Republicans and resulting
improvement in discipline among congressional Democrats).
253. See supra note 239.
254. See Daniel T. Slesnick, Gaining Ground: Poverty in the Postwar United States, 101 J. POL.
ECON. 1, tbl. 3 at 16 (1993). As the share of the poor has diminished, moreover, the ranks of the wealthy
have swelled. According to one estimate, the number of families with earnings of over $100,000 in constant
dollars has increased from slightly more than I million in 1967 to 5.6 million in 1993. David Frum,
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Stamp program, hunger as traditionally understood has been essentially
eliminated from American life2~5 The proportion of housing units that are
substandard declined from 16% in 1960 and 8.4% in 1970 to practically zero
today2 6 Life expectancy for those born in 1992 was nearly five years longer
than for those born in 1970.257 Both the quantity and quality of medical care
have improved enormously since 1965, and the rapid growth of the Medicare
and Medicaid programs has enabled low-income people to share in those gains.
Infant mortality rates dropped steadily during the post-1965 period; they fell
by more than half between 1970 and 1991.2 8 The percentage of Americans
who completed four or more years of college nearly tripled between 1960 and
1993.259 The rising quality of many public goods, such as recreational
facilities, highways, low-cost entertainment, and (as noted above) the
environment, also increased the value of Americans' consumption, albeit in
ways not captured by the national income accounts.260 Finally, the risk of a
large-scale war claiming American lives and treasure-a tragic reality in
1965-has diminished almost to the vanishing point today.
These gains in the quality of life since 1965 are remarkable by any
standard. All things considered, they may even exceed the gains during the
pre-1973 period, when the American economy, as conventionally measured,
was expanding at a faster rate. Even when set against the alarming increase in
family dissolution and its dire consequences, these gains remain impressive.
This dissolution, moreover, principally affects those Americans condemned to
live in or in close proximity to the underclass, a group that still constitutes a
Welcome, Nouveaux Riches, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 14, 1995, at A15. For a recent account of the improved
living conditions of the rural South Carolina poor between the 1960s and today, see Dana Milbank, Up
from Hunger: War on Poverty Won Some Battles as Return to Poor Region Shows, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30,
1995, at Al.
255. For an account of this development, see R. SHE? MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING
WELFARE RIGHTS 183-232 (1994). The quality of life for the most destitute Americans, including the
homeless and panhandlers, has improved dramatically as well. See Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic
Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165,
1190-91, 1203-04 (1996).
256. John C. Weicher, Private Production: Has the Rising Tide Lifted All Boats?, in HOUSING
AMERICA'S POOR 45, 46 (Peter D. Salins ed., 1987). The data also indicate that blacks have shared in these
improvements:
The percentage of black households lacking complete plumbing plunged ... and the percentage
living with more than one person per room dropped from 28.3% in 1960 to 9.1% in
1980.... The available data indicate that these auspicious trends have continued since 1980.
The residential situation of the institutionalized poor has also improved as prisons, mental
hospitals, and similar accommodations have become much more livable.
Robert C. Ellickson, The Untenable Case for an Unconditional Right to Shelter, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL. 17, 27 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
257. 1994 U.S. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 55, tbl. 114.
258. Id. tbl. 120. The decline was almost as rapid for blacks and other nonwhites. Id.
259. Steven A. Holmes, A Generally Healthy America Emerges in a Census Report, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
13, 1994, at B13.
260. The inadequacy of many of the dominant measures of public and private wealth, income, and
consumption is an old complaint. See, e.g., Peter Passell, Economic Scene, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1995, at
D2 (reviewing previous and current criticisms of national income accounting).
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relatively small share (approximately one to two percent) of the population.
The small size of the share, while no consolation to those who comprise it or
must reside near its members, nevertheless puts even this great failure into a
somewhat broader, more hopeful perspective.
The quality-of-life gains since 1965 for the vast majority of Americans,
then, have been enormous, perhaps unparalleled. It is impossible to know, of
course, whether those gains would have been even larger or more widespread
had we admitted fewer or different immigrants during this period.26' What
we do know is that the post-1965 immigrants, whom Brimelow condemns as
afflictions and parasites, did join American society, and that we are now a
more just, diverse, and prosperous society today than we were then. We can
also be certain that many of the values that immigrants, the new as well as the
old, brought with them will be essential to our continued vigor and progress.
Today and tomorrow, even more than yesterday, America desperately needs
what so many immigrants possess--optimism and energy, orientation to the
future, faith in education as the ladder upward, hunger for their own and their
children's success, and devotion to a dynamic, hopeful vision of America that
has lost focus for many native-born citizens.
We must reform immigration policy to meet our changing needs. In
particular, policy should assure that a larger share of the immigration flow
consists of individuals who are most likely to succeed in the American
economy of the twenty-first century. But it will take much, much more than
this book to convince me that we should eliminate or radically reduce that
flow. Immigration, including the post-1965 wave, has served America well. If
properly regulated, there is every reason to expect that it will continue to do
SO.
261. The difficulty of this question is not eased much by A Tale of Ten Cities: Immigration's Effect
on the Family Environment in American Cities, a report coauthored by demographer Leon Bouvier and
Scipio Garling and published by the Federation for American Immigration Reform in November 1995.
FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM, A TALE OF TEN CITIES: IMMIGRATION'S EFFECT ON
THE FAMILY ENVIRONMENT IN AMERICAN CITIES (1995). This report compares the quality of life in five
pairs of matched cities, each pair of which includes a high- and a low-immigration city. The report finds
in the low-immigration cities a much better quality of life, as measured by nine categories of variables:
education, income, occupation, home life, housing, cultural adaptation, crime, community, and health.
Comparisons of this kind, however, usually suffer from methodological weaknesses that make causal
inferences highly problematic, especially the inability to control for the many variables that make the paired
cities different for nonimmigration reasons. For a critique of the methodology of this report, see John E.
Berthoud, FAIR's "A Tale of Ten Cities": A Fair Analysis? (Nov. 1995) (unpublished report by Vice-
President of Alexis de Tocqueville Institution, on file with author). In addition to this serious problem, A
Tale of Ten Cities selected high-immigration cities with large concentrations of illegal aliens, which
inevitably distort the data. It also ignored the fact that, while most immigration-related costs are bome
locally, most immigration-generated benefits (e.g., increased tax revenues and economic efficiency) are
realized at higher levels.
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